of networked MGs and DNOs as well as the stochastic nature of RES based DGs

Of networked mgs and dnos as well as the stochastic

This preview shows page 2 - 4 out of 9 pages.

of networked MGs and DNOs as well as the stochastic nature of RES-based DGs have not been considered simultaneously in all of the above existing literature. However, RES-based DGs are important components of a MG and a modern active dis- tribution network may consist of several MGs that can run as autonomous entities. The coordinated optimal control of these MGs and the distribution system is an essential problem for the sound operation of a smart grid. The DNO and MG owners can benefit from the lower operation costs and higher profits. The customers can benefit from a more reliable and economical power supply. Therefore, it is necessary to consider them all together. In this paper, we present a decentralized power dispatch model for the coordinated operation of multiple MGs and a distribution system. The model takes into account uncertainties of RES-based DG outputs. The DNO and MGs are considered as different entities with their individual objectives. Since deci- sions made by one entity may influence the strategies of the other entities, the equilibriums may exist, where no entity can further optimize its own objective by unilaterally changing its decision. Therefore, we model the problem as a stochastic bi-level problem which can be transformed into a stochas- tic mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The equilibrium theory has been widely applied to power system operation and planning. Jenabi et al . [ 18 ] proposed a bi-level game approach for coordination between generation and transmission planning in a purely competitive electricity market. Shan and Ryan [ 19 ] applied the bi-level program considering fuel supply, social welfare, electricity generation, and transmission to solve the capacity expansion problem. Jalal Kazempour et al . [ 20 ] proposed a game- theoretic methodology to characterize generation investment equilibria in a pool-based electricity market. Wang et al . [ 21 ] proposed an incomplete information game model to study the generation capacity expansion problem. The Nash equi- librium is obtained by solving a bi-level optimization problem. In our model, the main objective of DNO and each MG is to minimize their own operation costs. The costs of a MG include the operation costs of DGs and the cost of purchas- ing electricity from the DNO: the revenues of a MG result from selling electricity to MG consumers and the utility grid. The costs of a DNO can be classified into operation costs
Image of page 2
WANG et al. : COORDINATED ENERGY MANAGEMENT OF NETWORKED MICROGRIDS 47 Fig. 1. Diagram of a radial electrical network. of DNO-owned DGs and the cost of purchasing electricity from MGs and the connected high voltage (HV) system; the revenues include selling electricity to the HV system, DNO consumers, and MGs. The model is formulated as a stochastic bi-level problem with the DNO at the upper level to guar- antee the operational constraints such as power flows and voltage levels and MGs at the lower level to minimize the operation costs of individual systems. This bi-level model has
Image of page 3
Image of page 4

You've reached the end of your free preview.

Want to read all 9 pages?

  • Fall '10
  • BOB

What students are saying

  • Left Quote Icon

    As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

    Student Picture

    Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

    Student Picture

    Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

    Student Picture

    Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern

Stuck? We have tutors online 24/7 who can help you get unstuck.
A+ icon
Ask Expert Tutors You can ask You can ask You can ask (will expire )
Answers in as fast as 15 minutes