And military than being an effort to restore the

and military than being an effort to restore the peace and security of the Libyan people.
As the con fl ict dragged on, there was more and more talk in international circles about
the need for ground troops to be deployed to ensure peace and security in Libya, and to
Meeting the Challenges of Strategic and Human Security Interests 11
Africa Review 4, 1, 2013: 1 – 16

establish a peace-keeping buffer between that country ’ s dictatorial regime and the
general population. As much as the USA attempted to insulate itself from that discus-
sion, it could not. Whether or not American troops were actually deployed on the
ground, the USA would no doubt be dragged, or wilfully enter, into support for this
shift in objective.
Even before the Libyan operation, US Congressional critics claimed that there was
no evidence that the military can satisfy its need to be concerned with American strategic
security interests, while simultaneously co-operating with African partners to address
their most pressing non-strategic security interests. In a 2008 Congressional hearing,
one Congress person stated that ‘ it looks like [AFRICOM is] going over there to
protect oil and fi ght terrorists, the same misguided way that we fought terrorists in
other places ’ ; another remarked that ‘ it sounds like AFRICOM is establishing a
process that ’ s in search of a problem ’ (Tucker, 2008). Other critics have been concerned
that AFRICOM, by attempting to ful fi l a diplomatic as well as a humanitarian mission,
would be infringing on the territory of such other agencies as the State Department and
the US Department of Agriculture. In addition to the problem of poor inter-agency co-
ordination, in the process of implementing AFRICOM, resources which might go to
other non-military foreign assistance would have to be diverted (LeVan, 2010). One
report to Congress suggests that between 2010 and 2015 AFRICOM will cost US
$4bn, and this excludes many of the other current military programmes in Africa,
which cost several billion dollars more per annum. Another source claims that the
USA spends approximately 30 times more on military operations globally than it
does on diplomacy and development. Moreover, the Pentagon commands more than
20 per cent of USA ’ s foreign assistance budget, as compared to 40 per cent that goes
to USAID (Tucker, 2008).
Despite obvious problems of co-ordination and implementation, the of fi cial line of
the State Department is that AFRICOM, once it is fully operational, would help advance
US interests in Africa (as they relate to development and democracy). In addition, sec-
onding foreign-service of fi cers to AFRICOM will help ensure that the Department of
Defense no longer has a very narrow military vision (Gribbin, 2008). As of the begin-
ning of 2011, however, AFRICOM has yet to live up to its promise of helping to ease
Africa ’ s problems of human security, including democratisation. What is more, the
Obama Administration has not clearly articulated human rights, let alone human secur-
ity, in Africa as a centrepiece of its foreign policy. Most of the resources and personnel
devoted to AFRICOM ’ s activities are for military purposes. In that respect, AFRICOM
does not have a clear diplomatic or development identity —