94%(18)17 out of 18 people found this document helpful
This preview shows page 66 - 67 out of 71 pages.
Rutherford 2011 (Ian. P. [Ph.D. candidate War Studies Program in the Royal Military College of Canada. Visiting Defense Fellow at the Center for International and Defense Policy, Queen’s University.] “NATO’s New Strategic Concept, Nuclear Weapons, and Global Zero.” International Journal66.2 (June, 2011) pp. 463-482. P. 480)A final consideration must focus on nonstate actors—terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda—and their widely reported quest for nuclear weapons. The instability of Pakistan’s government, the potentially nefarious influence of rogue elements of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, and the existence of the now-exposed A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network are often conflated to represent the risk that proliferationrepresents.27 While not denying the threat that a “man without fear” represents, deterrence through denial—denying access to nuclear weapons or fissile material to terrorist organizations—remains a viable, although far from foolproof, option.28 The proliferation security initiative is one aspect of this effort; another, more interesting, initiative involves the development of nuclear forensics. By studying the isotope composition of nuclear material (either before or after a nuclear explosion), the material’s origin and weapon design characteristics can be determined. In other words, states would not be able to supply fissile material or nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations and deny having done so.Impunity would be lost, so the traditional logic of deterrence would be reintroduced into the strategic calculus of the supplying nation. Given the likely response of any nuclear armed state to a radiological or terrorist nuclear attack on its soil, the fact that the source of the weapon can be determined is likely to greatly reduce the likelihood of a state supplying them.29 Thus, while nuclear terrorism remains a real threat, nuclear forensics renders it a distant one.Nuclear terrorism inevitable--acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists probable because of lack of security at nuclear reactors Dallas Morning News 10(Cause for Urgent Concern, Dallas News, 6/21)When counter-terrorism specialists talk about the importance of averting a potential "dirty bomb" attack, the public's natural tendency is to focus on big nuclear sites, such as power plants and weapons facilities. Few of us would worry about, say, an obscure hospital in central Brazil or a metal scrap yard in southern Spain. We should. According to nonproliferation experts, potent radioactive ingredients for a "dirty bomb" are available at vulnerable industrial and medical sites around the world. The small amountof the radioactive isotope Cesium-137 in a blood irradiator - found in cancer-treatment clinics worldwide- would have been enough to render Times Square uninhabitable for years had it been contained in the bomb found there in early May. In the United States alone, such irradiators are in use at an estimated 1,000 facilities. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission keeps a tight watch on them, and efforts are under