100%(1)1 out of 1 people found this document helpful
This preview shows page 92 - 94 out of 178 pages.
their domestic irritations and relatively isolated, as the rest of Asia is turning to Beijing. In the long run, the allies decide to scale down their security cooperation. The “transforming alliance” scenario (3) envisages an inward-looking China, caused by a severe economic crisis. As a result, the alliance adapts tofill the strategic vacuum and changes from a defensive alliance into a positive partnership for the prevention and management of crises in Asia, and the promotion of cooperation and economic integration, among others. The main lesson drawn from the scenario exercise is that the challenge for the Japan-US alliance is not strengthening its military deterrence, which in its current state appears to besatisfactory, and which over time will inevitably be challenged by the rapid modernization of the Chinese military. The real challenge is rather being able to handle an appeased China appeased in terms of assertive military behavior, but still active in terms of economic and institutional diplomacy. To do this, the allies should strengthen their power of attraction. Firstly, by ensuring the support and backing of security partners in Asia, who will not agree to enter into an "anti-Chinese quasi-coalition" but are willingto build their capacities and positively contribute to regional security cooperation. This regional support will make the difference in the eventuality of an open military crisis with China. In addition, it is crucial for maintaining the alliance’s influence in the region and avoiding its isolation in the event that China relatively eases off militarily, but continues its economic and institutional activism. Finally, the continuation of this "positive cooperation" will help to maintain cohesion in the alliance, even if the central, common threat is reduced. To this end, Japan and the United States should work to strengthen their cooperation and coordination in the non-traditional security domains(development assistance, maritime safety, anti-piracy operations, HA/DR operations, the fight against proliferation, energy security, climate change and environmental protection, economic and trade norms, etc.) by seeking to work with likeminded partners in the region, but also by encouraging the creation of cooperation
mechanisms and inclusive regional institutions likely to engage the Chinese regime in a constructive manner.Alliance is precarious with the Obama administration in its final year – the aff disrupts momentum that has been difficult to sustainGoodman and Parker 16Matthew P. Goodman is senior adviser for Asian economics and holds the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS, former White House coordinator for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit, former director for international economics on the National Security Council staff, former senior adviser to the under secretary for economic, energy, and agricultural affairs at the U.S. Department of State; David A. Parker is an associate fellow with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS (February 26, 2016, “Global Economics Monthly: The