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All this territory again which proves that battles

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all this territory again, which proves that battles decide everything. At the same time he wasobviously in danger at Prague of being attacked by the whole Austrian force, before Schwerinarrived. He would not have run this risk had he passed through Saxony with all his forces. In thatcase the first battle would have been fought perhaps near Budin, on the Eger, and it would havebeen as decisive as that of Prague. The dislocation of the Prussian army during the winter inSilesia and Saxony undoubtedly caused this concentric maneuver. It is important to notice thatcircumstances of this kind are generally more influential than the advantages to be gained by theform of attack. For facility of operations increases their speed, and the friction inherent in thetremendous war-machine of an armed power is so great in itself that it should not be increasedunnecessarily.12. Moreover, the principle of concentrating our forces as much as possible on the main pointdiverts us from the idea of strategic envelopment and the deployment of our forces followsautomatically. I was right, therefore, in saying that the form of this deployment is of littleconsequence. There is, however, one case in which a strategic move against the enemy's flankwill lead to great successes similar to those of a battle: if in a poor country the enemy hasaccumulated with great effort stores of supplies, on whose preservation his operations absolutelydepend. In this case it may be advisable not to march our main forces against those of the enemy,but to attack his base of supply. For this, however, two conditions are essential:(a) The enemy must be so far from his base that our threat will force him into a considerableretreat, and(b) We must be able to obstruct his advance in the direction followed by his principal force withonly a few troops (thanks to natural and artificial obstacles), so that he cannot make conquestssomewhere else which will compensate for the loss of his base.13. The provisioning of troops is a necessary condition of warfare and thus has great influenceon the operations, especially since it permits only a limited concentration of troops and since ithelps to determine the theater of war through the choice of a line of operations.14. The provisioning of troops is carried on, if a region possibly permits it, through requisitionsat the expense of the region.In the modern method of war armies take up considerably more territory than before. Thecreation of distinct, independent corps has made this possible, without putting ourselves at adisadvantage before an adversary who follows the old method of concentration at a single point(with from 70,000 to 100,000 men). For an independent corps, organized as they now are, canwithstand for some time an enemy two or three times its superior. Then the others will arriveand, even if the first corps has already been beaten, it has not fought in vain, as we have hadoccasion to remark.
PRINCIPLES OF WARGet any book for free on:23Today, therefore, the divisions and corps move into battle independently, marching side by side

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Term
Spring
Professor
BUTLER
Tags
Carl von Clausewitz, Terrain

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