I find that highly institutionalized ios are more

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I find that highly institutionalized IOs are more effective peace brokers than less institutionalized IOs. More specifically, I demonstrate that IOs with an institutionalized capability to plan and deploy field missions are more likely to mediate effectively, whereas information-gathering capability does not yield a significant advantage. The benefit from field missions is robust across procedural and substantive measures of outcomes. This result under- lines the already established value of third party guarantees in addressing problems of credible commitment (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Walter, 1997, 2002), further corroborating the contention that such guarantees have a strategic, forward-looking effect: the latent ability to pro- vide peacekeeping or monitoring forces can help an IO facilitate peace, even before such forces are deployed. My research demonstrates that such
33 guarantees are not uniformly effective and instead vary with the institutional characteristics of the mediator. Essay 3: IO interventions and bargaining mechanisms In the third essay, I explore how IOs can address bargaining problems that incentivize war, emphasizing the tracing of causal mechanisms. Comparing two interventions, one by the League of Arab States and one by the UN, in Syria in 2011–2012, the essay examines how the institutional capabilities of each IO shaped its attempts to address information and commitment prob- lems. While neither IO succeeded in bringing the war to a durable settle- ment, analysis of microdata on negotiation progress and fatalities demon- strates variation in outcomes: the League of Arab States (LAS) had minimal procedural and substantive effect, but the UN managed to negotiate a cease- fire and temporarily reduce the intensity of fighting. As expected, I find that outcomes covaried with institutional resources. The UN is endowed with greater instruments for civil war interventions, whereas the LAS has few and weakly institutionalized instruments. I also find that outcomes covaried with intergovernmental unity. At times when discord between member states was publicly signaled through the failure to reach consensual resolutions, IO interventions had no discernable impact on fatalities in Syria. These patterns of covariation help explain both variation between the two IOs and the longitudinal variation observed for the UN, which reduced fighting initially but failed to do so in the long term The primary contribution of this essay is to provide evidence on how in- stitutional capabilities impact, via two causal mechanisms, the bargaining strategies of civil war disputants. The analysis identifies three mediation substrategies aimed at reducing information problems: counsel on the costs of conflict, provision of coordination points, and strategic management of the bargaining context. Drawing on greater institutional capabilities, the UN could maintain a greater scope and proficiency across all three strategies. It consulted more widely, designed a cease-fire that better reflected the nature

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