Civil Affairs Task Force and its collateral agencies were constantly venturing into the city, they needed to know which neigh- borhoods were safe (green) and which ones weren’t. Again, the daily briefing became the vehicle by which this threat informa- tion was disseminated to the task force. The agencies in the audience were thus able to provide their respective units with timely, accurate and reliable information. In fact, the information was processed from collector to decision-maker in about 12 hours, cutting the normal cycle in half. The following example illustrates how information reached the decision-maker in a timely manner: The Kuwaiti govern- ment planned to conduct a “sweep” for weapons in the Palestinian neighborhood of Hawalli. The CATF, acting on informa- tion received from the assessment teams, reported to the government that the sweep would probably be met by armed resis- tance and advised against it. Influenced by this information, the Kuwaiti govern- ment called off the sweep. FM 41-10 states that a collection plan is to be used as a means of prioritizing infor- mation needed for processing. The neigh- borhood assessment report also designated certain priority intelligence requirements, or PIRs: 1. What is the status of available food andwater supplies throughout the city? 2. Will there be a general increase in crim-inal activity as a result of the Iraqioccupation of Kuwait? 3. What hazards do assessment teamsface? What are the locations of equip-ment, weapons caches and ordnance?
equipment at a Kuwait City bank. Theteam reported the find to the G-2, whichinventoried the item and transferred it tothe 513th MI Brigade.CoordinationCollection and dissemination of CAinformation call for close coordinationbetween Civil Affairs and military intelli-gence assets. The intel assets of TaskForce Freedom successfully integratedtheir limited resources. The G-2 coordinat-ed with the 513th MI Brigade, the 8thMarine Regiment and the Armed ForcesMedical Intelligence Command. TheAFMIC assessed the viability of KuwaitCity’s hospitals and medical clinics. TheG-2 section also interfaced throughoutKuwait City with teams from the 3rd and5th Special Forces Groups, to verify andexchange information. Coordinationproved useful in verifying information andhelped minimize miscommunication, dis-semination of conflicting data and compe-tition between activities.A successful coordination effort devel-oped between an officer from the ArmedForces Medical Intelligence Command andpersonnel from the 5th Special ForcesGroup. The AFMIC officer “piggybacked”with medical teams while they were per-forming their missions. On one occasion,the medical team and the AFMIC officerdiscovered that the Iraqis had used cityhospitals to store military equipment of nomedical value. They promptly reported theinformation to the CA legal team, whichdetermined that the use of medical facili-ties was inappropriate and possibly ahuman-rights violation.
- Spring '19
- John Foe
- Cold War, United States Army, Special forces