were infuriated at the attempt and immediately seized some Spartan envoys who were in Athens, but they insisted they knew nothing of the plan and the Spartans would execute Sphodrias for his did. They were then released. Many Spartans were outraged at Sphodrias’ behavior, but Agesilaus’ influence saved him from punishment.Sthenelaidas:the dilemma which Athens, this new kind of power, constitutes for Sparta, the traditionalist leading state in Greece. Two distinct Spartan types -- the old king Archidamos and the blunt government official Sthenelaidas -- argue over how best to confront Athens. Both men recognize the dangers which
Athens posed to Sparta's position in the Greek world, but each stresses a different side of the problem. Archidamos clearly understands the fundamental difference between Athenian power, with its roots in the empire and in the coercive extraction of wealth by which to maintain a near professional military force, andSpartan authority, with its reliance upon consensus and upon the willing support of many disparate and touchy allies. Archidamos argues that Sparta should wait before declaring war and accumulate financial reserves of its own. Sthenelaidas, by contrast, delivers a brief but furious harangue in which he calls for immediate action. Sthenelaidas stresses a critical aspect of Sparta's position: whatever Sparta's financial reserves, it depends first and foremost upon the respect, more or less freely given, of its many allies. Because Spartan power is qualitatively different from that of Athens, the Spartans cannot afford to take their time. The two men thus articulate two sides of a dilemma to which no good solution existed -- in Thucydides' eyes, the ultimate Spartan victory was an accident, more the consequence of Athenian errors than of Spartan strength.Sybota: 433 BC, Battle of Sybota was Corinth vs. Corcyra. Athens agrees to enter into a purely defensive alliance with Corcyra. After a while in the battle, Corinth gets the upper hand and the Athenians enter the battle. Corinthians would have won, but Athens sends 20 more ships for reinforcements who arrived after the battle had turned. Corinth thought that it was a trap because they saw only 10 ships and left in fear. symmacia:Fundamentally, an agreement between states to fight together (symmachein) against a common enemy, so that the standard term is symmachia Such alliances might be made either for a limited period or for all time. Thucydides, 1. 44. 1, 5. 48. 2, distinguishes between a symmachia, as a full offensive and defensive alliance, and an epimachia, as a purely defensive alliance. Sometimes were used interchangeably.In a full offensive and defensive alliance it was commonly stated that the participating states were to ‘have the same friends and enemies’: that formulation might be used when the alliance was on an equal basis, but it could be adapted to circumstances in which one participant was inferior to the other, as in 404 BC when Athens undertook both to have the same friends and enemies as Sparta and to follow Sparta's lead.