Since negotiations were discarded, Gronouski betrayed the Poles by recommending the Soviet Union take Poland’s place in peace initiatives. Gronouski recommended the Soviets to take over the negotiations and that the cessation of bombing around Hanoi would still be in placeuntil the efforts of the Soviet Union failed. He also believed that the United States has the initiative towards negotiations and should use it to their advantage with the Soviets, the Pope, and U Thant. He wanted to curb the possible inclination of Polish public propaganda because he 52 U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,Volume IV.Vietnam.1966.355,
wanted to maintain secrecy on the initiative.53The United States believed that the Soviet Union be the mediator since the Poles failed to have negotiations to take effect. In addition, the Americans felt they would make significant progress when dealing with the Soviets over the Poles. However, there was resentment against the Poles because the Americans would not acceptthe blame for the failure of the talks and distrusted the Poles ability to create diplomatic entreaties. The Soviet Union believed that the Americans were deliberately trying to force surrender out of North Vietnam so that negotiations could go in their favor. The Ambassador remarked thatthe initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government considerable hope and the bombing of Hanoi spoiled the optimism that was present before. The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by U.S. actions in Vietnam and did not know how to judge U.S. policy. He wondered whether or not the Americans were moving towards diplomatic negotiationsor a military victory.54The rest of the world did not understand what had occurred when the American bombed Hanoi during a time period when negotiations could have saved the Americans from embarrassment. Another thing is that the Poles were taken for granted and the Americans thought Poland would keep North Vietnam in negotiations.For diplomatic and military moves, there were different individuals responsible for these actions. Similarly, in the case of the coincidence between the 37-day bombing pause and the stepped-up ground operations in South Vietnam, no one familiar with the workings of large 53 U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,Volume IV.Vietnam.1966.355, 54 U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,Volume IV.Vietnam.1965.354, -68v04/d354
bureaucratic organizations would be surprised that responsibility for military moves and diplomatic initiatives was in the hands of separate groups of officials.