Since negotiations were discarded gronouski betrayed

Since negotiations were discarded, Gronouski betrayed the Poles by recommending the
Soviet Union take Poland’s place in peace initiatives. Gronouski recommended the Soviets to
take over the negotiations and that the cessation of bombing around Hanoi would still be in place
until the efforts of the Soviet Union failed. He also believed that the United States has the
initiative towards negotiations and should use it to their advantage with the Soviets, the Pope,
and U Thant. He wanted to curb the possible inclination of Polish public propaganda because he
52
U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to
President Johnson, in Texas,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume IV.Vietnam.1966.355,

wanted to maintain secrecy on the initiative. 53 The United States believed that the Soviet Union
be the mediator since the Poles failed to have negotiations to take effect. In addition, the
Americans felt they would make significant progress when dealing with the Soviets over the
Poles. However, there was resentment against the Poles because the Americans would not accept
the blame for the failure of the talks and distrusted the Poles ability to create diplomatic
entreaties.
The Soviet Union believed that the Americans were deliberately trying to force surrender
out of North Vietnam so that negotiations could go in their favor. The Ambassador remarked that
the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government considerable hope and the
bombing of Hanoi spoiled the optimism that was present before. The Ambassador said that his
Government was frankly baffled by U.S. actions in Vietnam and did not know how to judge U.S.
policy. He wondered whether or not the Americans were moving towards diplomatic negotiations
or a military victory.
54
The rest of the world did not understand what had occurred when the
American bombed Hanoi during a time period when negotiations could have saved the
Americans from embarrassment. Another thing is that the Poles were taken for granted and the
Americans thought Poland would keep North Vietnam in negotiations.
For diplomatic and military moves, there were different individuals responsible for these
actions. Similarly, in the case of the coincidence between the 37-day bombing pause and the
stepped-up ground operations in South Vietnam, no one familiar with the workings of large
53
U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to
President Johnson, in Texas,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume IV.Vietnam.1966.355,
54
U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964-1968, Volume IV.Vietnam.1965.354, -
68v04/d354

bureaucratic organizations would be surprised that responsibility for military moves and
diplomatic initiatives was in the hands of separate groups of officials.