26
While the latter leads to what Garay calls “inclusive”
policies that “provide relatively generous benefits to all or a large pool of
outsiders,” the former results in the opposite: “restrictive” policies that “are
implemented in a state-centric way, typically discouraging social groups from
making policy demands” (2010, 2). In short, if parties seek to attract new
voters, they provide restrictive, limited, or even clientelistic goods, yet if they
seek to placate anti-government protest or mobilization, they provide
broader-scale or even universal goods. This framework, which I refer to as the
inclusive-restrictive model, can be seen in Figure 2:
Figure 2 — Garay’s inclusive-restrictive model of social policy
To Garay, this implies that both short-term shifts in social programs
and longer-term trends towards universalism are largely acts of suppressing
mobilization against the government (2010). Social programs act as
26
According to Garay, the former occurred in Mexico and Chile, while the latter in Argentina
and Brazil (2010).
Chapter 1
—
33
bargaining tools used by the government against protest organizations. The
central implication is that the PJ is immediately concerned with changes in
the political attitudes and mobilization strategies of its base. With the base
mobilizing against them, this means the Peronists may have changed their
focus from buying off the marginal voter to targeting large, class-based blocs
of voters. And indeed she argues that the gradual expansion of social policies
in Argentina through the late 1990s and the 2000s, beginning with the
Plan
Trabajar
under Menem and the PJJH under Duhalde, was a direct impact of
unrest and popular discontent.
27
As Garay says:
Negotiation with social movements and allied labor unions led to
broad, relatively generous, and participatory social policies.
Further, pressure from below led the national government to
create rule-based schemes rather than clientelist, selective
benefits as social movements pressed for rule-based policies to
prevent the manipulation that could exclude them from
receiving benefits (2010, 59).
As popular discontent was channeled into unusually large and effectively
organized efforts at mobilization,
28
those efforts were able to put pressure on
the government to provide greater services and policy expansion—i.e.
broadening the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries (Garay 2010).
27
For more on the
piqueteros
and the PJJH, see Chapter 4. Additionally, more on the
surprising power and sustainability of the
piqueteros
can be found in
Ponce 2006.
28
Relatedly, Garay describes the factors that have made protest, organization, and
mobilization in Argentina unusually effective in her article “Social Policy and Collective
Action: Unemployed Workers, Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina” (2007).
Chapter 1
—
34
Because it highlights the difference between intra- and extra-
coalitional political motivations, Garay’s theory is deeply influential in my
theory on party structures and clientelism. Garay’s work implies that the
