26While the latter leads to what Garay calls “inclusive” policies that “provide relatively generous benefits to all or a large pool of outsiders,” the former results in the opposite: “restrictive” policies that “are implemented in a state-centric way, typically discouraging social groups from making policy demands” (2010, 2). In short, if parties seek to attract new voters, they provide restrictive, limited, or even clientelistic goods, yet if they seek to placate anti-government protest or mobilization, they provide broader-scale or even universal goods. This framework, which I refer to as the inclusive-restrictive model, can be seen in Figure 2: Figure 2 — Garay’s inclusive-restrictive model of social policy To Garay, this implies that both short-term shifts in social programs and longer-term trends towards universalism are largely acts of suppressing mobilization against the government (2010). Social programs act as 26According to Garay, the former occurred in Mexico and Chile, while the latter in Argentina and Brazil (2010).
Chapter 1 — 33 bargaining tools used by the government against protest organizations. The central implication is that the PJ is immediately concerned with changes in the political attitudes and mobilization strategies of its base. With the base mobilizing against them, this means the Peronists may have changed their focus from buying off the marginal voter to targeting large, class-based blocs of voters. And indeed she argues that the gradual expansion of social policies in Argentina through the late 1990s and the 2000s, beginning with the Plan Trabajar under Menem and the PJJH under Duhalde, was a direct impact of unrest and popular discontent.27As Garay says: Negotiation with social movements and allied labor unions led to broad, relatively generous, and participatory social policies. Further, pressure from below led the national government to create rule-based schemes rather than clientelist, selective benefits as social movements pressed for rule-based policies to prevent the manipulation that could exclude them from receiving benefits (2010, 59). As popular discontent was channeled into unusually large and effectively organized efforts at mobilization,28those efforts were able to put pressure on the government to provide greater services and policy expansion—i.e. broadening the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries (Garay 2010). 27For more on the piqueteros and the PJJH, see Chapter 4. Additionally, more on the surprising power and sustainability of the piqueteros can be found inPonce 2006. 28Relatedly, Garay describes the factors that have made protest, organization, and mobilization in Argentina unusually effective in her article “Social Policy and Collective Action: Unemployed Workers, Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina” (2007).
Chapter 1 — 34Because it highlights the difference between intra- and extra-coalitional political motivations, Garay’s theory is deeply influential in my theory on party structures and clientelism. Garay’s work implies that the