"It was at this time that the First Army Corps was organized, with Zhu De as commander and myself as political commissar. It was com- posed of the Third Army, the Fourth Army commanded by Lin Biao, and the Twelfth Army, under Luo Pinghui. Party leadership was vested in a Front Committee, of which I was chairman. There were already more than 10,000 men in the First Army Corps then, orga- nized into ten divisions. Besides this main force, there were many local and independent regiments, Red Guards and partisans. "Red tactics, apart from the political basis of the movement, explained much of the successful military development. At Jinggan- shan four slogans had been adopted, and these give the clue to the methods of partisan warfare used, out of which the Red Army grew. The slogans were: "1. When the enemy advances, we retreat! "2. When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them! "3. When the enemy seeks to avoid a battle, we attack! "4. When the enemy retreats, we pursue! "These slogans [of four characters each in Chinese] were at first op- posed by many experienced military men, who did not agree with the type of tactics advocated. But much experience proved that the tactics were correct. Whenever the Red Army departed from them, in gen- eral, it did not succeed. Our forces were small, exceeded from ten to twenty times by the enemy; our resources and fighting materials were limited, and only by skillfully combining the tactics of maneuvering and guerrilla warfare could we hope to succeed in our struggle against the Guomindang, fighting from vastly richer and superior bases. "The most important single tactic of the Red Army was, and remains, its ability to concentrate its main forces in the attack, and swiftly divide and separate them afterwards. This implied that posi- tional warfare was to be avoided, and every effort made to meet the living forces of the enemy while in movement, and destroy them. On the basis of these tactics the mobility and the swift, powerful 'short attack' of the Red Army was developed.
12 STUART SCHRAM The Struggle on Two Fronts 1967 Stuart Schram is the dean of Mao studies in the West. Beginning in the mid-1960s, he produced an excellent biography of Mao, from which this brief selection is taken, as well as several editions of selected translations of Mao's writings and other studies on Mao and modern China. Although many biographies of Mao have been written in the past thirty- five years, Schram's has retained its reputation among scholars as one of the most reliable and well researched. This selection describes the context out of which the famous Yan'an Rectification Movement emerged. Mao and the CCP faced a struggle on two fronts-against the japanese invaders and against their erstwhile allies, the Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek. Both wanted to see the end of the CCP. Mao's response was ideological and educational, as well as military and organizational. This was the context of Mao's successful effort to Sinify (adapt to Chinese conditions) Russian Marxism- Leninism. (See Nick Knight's analysis of Mao's
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- Mao Zedong, People's Republic of China, Zedong. Mao