232NOTES TO CHAPTER ONEfrom one particular sort, than from another particular sort” (49). If pleasure is how we turn toward certain things, then pleasure is always bent. Pleasure for Bentham is a bodily orientation that reveals a social orientation, a tendency to have a certain tendency. The importance of thinking about happiness as contiguous with pleasure sensations is that it allows us to keep our attention on the bodily dimensions of happiness. I do not want to take the body out of happiness.3 I should acknowledge here that Spinoza suggests that being affected, even joyfully, is a form of passivity, in which the idea formed is inadequate or con-fused. An affect “is a passion” which thus “ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” ( 2001: 231). The ethical task for Spinoza is thus to become free from “the bondage” of passions through rea-son: “It is therefore most profitable to us in life to make perfect the intellect or reason as far as possible, and in this one thing consists the highest happi-ness or blessedness of man” (217). To be blessed would be to have adequate ideas, or to be the cause of your own ideas: “he is led adequately to conceive himself and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence” (217). See my conclusion for some further discussion of Spinoza (or to be more accurate, Deleuze’s Spinoza), with specific reference to the passive/active distinction.4 This book draws on phenomenology but I would not say it offers a phenome-nology of happiness, as my own points of reference here are primarily outside this intellectual tradition. Or if it does offer a phenomenology of happiness, it would be a rather queer phenomenology (see Ahmed 2006). A phenome-nology of happiness is perhaps yet to be written, although of course there is considerable literature on phenomenology and emotion more generally (a classic essay would be Sartre  2002; see also Solomon 2006 for further references). A phenomenology of happiness might draw on Husserl’s later work, in particular his approach to the living body (Leib), affect and value, and the life-world, which is often represented as his shift from a static to a genetic and then generative phenomenology (see Thompson 2007: 28–36). I should note here that Husserl’s model offers a quite different model of affect and value than we find in Locke’s empirical psychology in which “to be affected” is to give value to things. Henning Peucker suggests that Husserl would be criti-cal of any sentimentalism that would describe feelings as “giving things spe-cific value properties” (2007: 312). Peucker’s own task is to show how Husserl critiques the Kantian presumption that all moral feeling is pathological. Ac-cording to Peucker, Husserl mediates between Kant and the sentimentalists by arguing that things already have value properties: “the ego is thus affected by objects with value properties” (316).