moments of this flow (Husserl 1991, 79-80). At this level, there is no-thing enduring anymore, there is only pure duration itself, and Husserl confesses that he is at a loss for
10 words to characterize or depict it, “ for all this, w e lack names” (Husserl 1991, 79). One can only speak of the a bsolute flux of consciousness “ in conformity with what is constituted, ” i.e. with the conceptual vocabulary already used in the theorizing of the second level of the formal structure of time. Husserl therefore uses a series of metaphors which convey the ch aracteristics of such an “absolute flux”, such as “flux” itself, but also “ source-point ,” “ continuity ”, and so on. The question then becomes: how can one be aware of the unity of such an absolute flux? Such unity has to be asserted in order to derive every moment of consciousness as a moment of this primordial flux. Furthermore, if one is to speak of one consciousness, one needs to say something about the unity of the absolute flux. Husserl’s solution is articulated along the idea that the unity of the absolute flux of consciousness is formed at once with the constitution of immanent temporal objects : they are both constituted in “the same flux of consciousness” by what he terms a “ duality in the i ntentionality of the retention”: There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself becomes constituted at once. As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does (Husserl 1991, 84) And, a few pages later, Consequently, two inseparably united intentionalities , requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness (…) The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only exists but is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the
11 flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself (Husserl 1991, 87-88). How Husserl conceives of time as a ‘self - constituting’ absolute flux of consciousness will then give rise, as seen below, to objective time as a derivative category. There is much to say on this. In the derivation of objective time from an absolute flux of consciousness, I suggest we find traces of a specifically modern temporal experience. The separation of human time and worldly time Husserlian time appears ultimately rooted in the self-constitut ing “absolute flux of consciousness ,” as a formal structure itself product of intentionalities of consciousness. In the analysis of the three levels of time constitution, level one, objective time, is a derivative of the intentional interactions between level two and three. Crucially, what allows Husserl
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