Madison supra note 10 at 82 Undoubtedly the Framers were more keenly aware of

Madison supra note 10 at 82 undoubtedly the framers

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Madison), supra note 10, at 82. Undoubtedly, the Framers were more keenly aware of the influence of factions after experiencing the instructionist period of the early state governments described above. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text. 61. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 350-51. 62. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 83 (discussing how large republics minimize the influence of individual factions). 63. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (James Madison) (exploring the separation of powers doctrine). 1991]
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DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W this section presents individual members of Congress as a collective faction with its own special interest: reelection. 6 4 A. Effects of the Reelection Incentive By being elected, modern congresspersons meet the formal requirements of popular authorization. Representatives also might argue that their electoral dependence implies a duty to do what the people "want." 6 5 Interestingly, how- ever, much of what modern constituents seem to "want" has no immediate connection to what we normally think of as legislation. For example, commen- tators have argued that representatives' desire to be reelected encourages them to do casework 66 and advertising, 6 " which arguably have little to do with legis- lation." The reelection incentive also encourages congresspersons to do things we typically think of as more traditional legislative activities, like pork-barrel- ing 69 and influence peddling. 7 0 While congresspersons reply that these activi- 64. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISH- MENT (1977) (arguing the existence of the "Washington Establishment"); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (analyzing congressmen as "single minded seek- ers of reelection"). 65. Hanna Pitkin argues that representation does not imply that a representative should auto- matically and mechanically do what constituents "want." See PITKIN, supra note 57, at 214-15. Rather, a representative should base legislative decisions on constituents' best overall interests, which the representative may know because she has more information (perhaps obtained through deliberation). Constituent wants and interests will usually coincide, but when they do not, a repre- sentative should be free to make a choice based on the best information about the people's inter- ests. Id. at 217. A choice that goes against constituent wishes requires a reasonable explanation, but should not be prohibited. Id. 66. Casework, or constituent service, is a simplified term for the bureaucratic "unsticking" ac- tivities that members of Congress perform for constituents (e.g., procuring delayed social security checks or tax refunds). FIORINA, supra note 64, at 42-45. 67. Formal and informal advertising can include "frequent visits to the constituency, nonpoliti- cal speeches to home audiences, the sending out of infant care booklets and letters of condolence and congratulation." MAYHEW, supra note 64, at 49-52.
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