Breach failure to meet the standard of care 3cause in

Breach – failure to meet the standard of care
3. Cause-in-Fact
a. Harm must have the required nexus to the D’s breach
(i) Connection between action and effect
(ii) Must be shown to have actually caused injury
4. Legal or Proximate Cause
a. No policy reasons to relieve the D of liability
(i) Effect must be foreseeable, not so remote that the harm was unexpected
5. Damage
a. P suffers injury
b) Duty
i) Duty only extends to those that are reasonably foreseeable to be endangered (Zone of
Danger)
1. Majority View (Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, p. 172)
2. Forseeablity not needed for intentional torts, or transferred intent
ii) Former View/ Andrews dissent
1. A negligent act is negligent not only to those foreseeable, but also to anyone who is
injured
2. Duty owed to the word (Andrews dissent in Palsgraf)
a. Andrews dissent in Palsgraf: a negligent act is wrong to the public at large, not
to those who happen to be within the zone of danger. If negligence (breach of
duty) towards one person injures a third person, that person is foreseeable.
b. But, Negligence could be limited by proximate cause, but dissent in Palsgraf
said that foreseeablity should be viewed in hindsight!
c) Limits on Duty
i) No Duty Rule
1. There is no general duty to come to the aid of another or continue aiding another
ii) Duty to Aid Exception
1. Special Relationship between P and D (Duty to aid)
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Torts I 2008 Professor Kornfeld
a. Business/Customer, Employer/Employee, Parent/Child, Captain/Passenger,
Teacher/Student, Doctor/Patient, Invitees, Licensees (probably)
(i) Not Fellow Travelers, Roommates
b. Therapist/Third Party – Duty to Warn
(i) Reasonable care to protect (Duty to warn) required when therapist knows or
should know based on professional standards that patient presents a serious
danger of extreme violence to another
1. Must be a specific victim (CA statutory limit)
2. Actual determination of threat (CA statutory limit)
3. The privilege of confidentiality ends where the public peril begins
4. Tarasoff v. UC Regents, p. 215 (Therapist’s patient murdered P)
c. Police/Potential Victims
(i) no general duty to aid absent a special relationship
(ii) A general duty would allow judges to second guess police
2. Instrument Under Control of the D (Duty to aid)
a. Split – Historic Rule: No duty when accident is not D’s fault
3. Commencing an act that puts P in worse position / Voluntary Acts that put P in
Worse Position (Duty to continue aid)
a. Change of Risk - Danger of Harm has been increased by partial performance
b. Detrimental Reliance - P has forgone other opportunities in reliance on the
performance
(i) Detrimental reliance
1. Ayres v. Hicks, p. 204 (Hikers / Ski Patrol)
c. Obligation exists even when the accident is caused
(i) without any fault on part of the D
(ii) by the negligence of the P or a third party
d. Plaintiff is only entitled to recover for an aggravation of his injuries
(i) Damages restricted to damages that are the proximate result of the D’s
actionable negligence
4. Good Samaritan Statutes
a. Options to encourage aid:
(i) Limit to Medical Professionals
(ii) Limit to Bad Faith, Recklessness
(iii) Liability only for gross negligence
iii) Land Occupier Duty
1.