Ad 1 it should be said that the irascible and

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Ad 1. It should be said that the irascible and concupiscible taken in themselves, as parts of sense appetite, are coUlmon to us and to the brutes. But insofar as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, they THE VIRTUES 667 are peculiar to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. Ad 2. It should be said that just as man's flesh docs not of itself have the good of virtue but becomes the instrument of the virtuous act insofar as, moved by reason, we employ our members to serve justice, so too the irascible and concupiscible do not of themselves have the, good of virtue but rather the infection of lust, yet insofar as they arc conformed to reason the good of moral virtue comes to be in them. Ad 3. It should be said that body is not ruled by soul in the same way that the irascible and cOllcupiscible are ruled by reason, for body obeys soul on command without contradiction with respect to the things in which it is fashioned to be moved by the soul. That is why the Philosopher says in Politics 1.2 that soul rules body with a despotic rule, that is, as a mastel' rules his slave, and the complete motion of body is referred to soul. Because of this there is no virtue in the body, but only in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason on command, but have proper motions of their own which sometimes atc opposed to reason, hence in the same book the Philosophel' says that reason rules the irascible and concupiscible with a political rule, in the way free men who have a will of their own are ruled. Because of this there must be in the irascible and concupiscible virtues whereby they are disposed to act well. Ad 4. It should be said that there are two things in choice, namely the intention of the end, which pertains to moral virtue, and the preconception of that which is for the sake of the end, which pertains to prudence, as is said in Ethics 6.I2. That there is a right intention of the end in the passions of the soul is brought about by the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible appetites. Therefore, moral vii'tues which concern the passions are in the irascible and cOl1cupiscible, but prudence is in reason. Article 5: Are the apprehensive powers of sense subjects of virtue? It seems they are. L Sense appetite can be the subject of virtue insofar as it obeys reason; but the interior apprehensive powers of sense obey reason, for at the command of reason, imagination, the cogitative and memory act. Thel'c can therefore be virtue in these powers. 2. Moreover, just as rational appetite, that is, will, can be impeded in its act or indeed helped by sense appetite, so too intellect or reason can
668 P AU.'IS (I269-72) be impeded or even aided by the foregoing powers. Therefore, just as there can be viitue in the appetitive powers of sense, so too in its apprehensive powers.

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