38 this problem is analogous to other global public

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38 This problem is analogous to other global public goods problems, which are most closely analyzed in connection with environmental protection. It may well be, also, that this component of the global security against cyberterrorism problem has characteristics of a network, in which the more states that take action to contribute, the greater the value to each state: payoffs increase with the number of states that participate. Under these circumstances, it may be easier to sustain cooperation among large numbers of states. 39 Finally, it is worth noting that a number of arms control contexts may also have the characteristics of a prisoner’s dilemma, with similar responsive dynamics. 40 While there may come a time when cyberwarfare is sought to be subjected to arms control, any efforts along these lines will encounter substantial problems of verification. b. Coordination Problem: The Global Cyberspace Stag Hunt In other areas, there is a different type of collective action problem. It may be possible for each state to choose whether to protect its own networks in a less effective way, or to join together to protect global cyberspace. However, the effectiveness of the latter approach may be dependent on the extent to which other states make a similar decision. Under the stag hunt, which is a type of “assurance” game, each state may obtain smaller payoffs—a lower level of protection—by seeking to protect only its networks, but if states are able to coordinate to forego settling for a lesser level of local protection or other local benefits in favor of global protection, they will each achieve a higher level of security. Cooperation may break down if players are uncertain about the preferences and strategy of others. The stag hunt game is derived from a Rousseauvian fable of cooperation among hunters. 41 Unless all hunters are committed to catching the stag, it will escape. Each individual hunter may be tempted by a passing rabbit. Each hunter prefers a share of stag to an individual portion of rabbit, but is uncertain about whether other hunters are sufficiently committed to capturing stag. The analogy to cybersecurity is as follows: each state prefers its share of global security against cyberterrorism (stag), but may be distracted by the opportunity to provide local security (rabbit), especially if it is unsure of the commitment of other states. 38 For an extended analysis, see Norman & Trachtman, supra note 38. 39 Norman & Trachtman, supra note 37. 40 See Downs, Rocke & Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation , 38 W ORLD P OL . 118, 130 (1985). 41 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Trade Controls , 50 L. & C ONTEMP . P ROBS . 117 (1987).
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Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization 25 Table 2: A Stag Hunt Game 42 B Hunt Stag/ Global Protection Chase Rabbit/Local Protection Hunt Stag/ Global Protection 4;4 1,3 A Chase Rabbit/ Local Protection 3,1 2,2 In international organization terms, a stag hunt context requires a lesser level of international legal inducements to compliance, compared to the prisoner’s dilemma.
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  • Spring '12
  • Kushal Kanwar
  • global cyberterrorism

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