23.Note that prior to the crisis the president had read BarbaraTuchmanBs book, The Guns of August, and during the =thirteen daysA hemade explicit reference to the lessons of 1914. For a view that the fear of nuclear war was the controlling factor in the@outcome of the crisis, see James G. Blight, The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990).24.David Lowenthal, U.S. Cuban Policy: Illusion and Reality,ANational Review, 29 January 1963, 61@63 at p. 63. More scholarly interpretations, for example, that of Edward Crankshaw in his commentsin Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), accept the Soviet leaderBs assertion that he shipped the missiles to protect Cuba. See Lebow, p. 436.25.For another critical perspective, see Richard M. Nixon, =Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy,A Reader@s Digest, November 1964, 281=284ff.26.For example, General Curtis LeMay, then head of the Strategic Air Command, stated in a 1984 interview, Bin my mind, therewasnAt a chance that we would have gone to war with Russia because wehad overwhelming strategic capability and the Russians knew it.= See Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, @U.S. Strategic Air Power, 1948A1962. Excerpts from an Interview with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, et al.,B International Security, 12(4) (Spring 1988): 78@95, at p. 95. General Maxwell Taylor and Paul Nitze were also critical of Kennedy for not driving a harder bargain with the Soviets.27.See I. F. Stone, BThe Brink,A New York Review of Books, 14 April 1966. For other critical views, see, for example, Ronald Steel, @End Game,A New York Review of Books, 13 March 1969; Barton Bernstein, @The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?A Political Science Quarterly, 95 (Spring 1980): firstname.lastname@example.org.BPlain Lessons of a Bad Decade,A Foreign Policy, 1 (Winter 1970@71): 32.29.For a more comprehensive discussion of BchickenA in game theory and in relation to crisis behavior, see Robert J. Lieber, Theory and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1972), pp. 22@28.This discussion draws in detail from pp. 26B27.30.This problem was identified by Karl Deutsch, in Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 69B70. Deutsch also developed the argument about the consequent decreasing probabilities of survival.31.Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 705.