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4.Court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by sameauthority that any other exists by, and the military law is abranch of law as valid as the others.It differs from other laws only because- it applies to officers andsoldiers but not to other members of the body politic, it islimited to beaches of military duty.
PUYAT vs DE GUZMANFacts:After an election for the Directors of the International PipeIndustries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondentAcero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings,questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then amember of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered hisappearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which thepetitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that noAssemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrativebody,” and SEC was an administrative body. AssemblymanFernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI forP200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following thenotarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed amotion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPIshares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SECgranted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership ofthe said 10 shares.Issue:Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholderof IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art.VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution?Decision:Commissioner’s order granting Fernandez to leave tointervene in SEC was reversed and set aside. He had signified hisintention to appear as counsel for Acero which was objected to bypetitioners. He decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legalinterest in the matter under litigation. the Court is constrained tofind that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel beforean administrative body. That is a circumvention of theConstitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec.14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him toappear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
PJA vs PRADO227SCRA 703G.R.No.105371November11,1993FACTS:Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw thefranking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, theRegional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal TrialCourts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,along with certain other government offices.The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that:(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express itspurposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses ofCongress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributedamong the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory andencroachesontheindependenceoftheJudiciary.