Page ° 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 832, * 2NC – AT: CFIUS doesn’t review cyber espionage cases Yes they do Rosenzweig 13 – (Paul Rosenzweig is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute and serves as a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, a Senior Editor of the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, and as a Visiting Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; he is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group. Mr. Rosenzweig formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security; 5/26/13, “Cybersecurity, CFIUS, and the Propose SoftBank Purchase of Sprint-Nextel,” Lawfare , , Accessed 6/27/16, HWilson) The answer lies in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS is an inter-agency committee authorized to review transactions that could result in control of a US business by a foreign person (known as “covered transactions”), in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States. CFIUS operates pursuant to section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 and as implemented by Executive Order 11858 (as amended), and regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800. The Director of National Intelligence is tasked with conducting an intelligence assessment of the risks posed by certain transactions and reporting to the committee on his findings. His representative sits, ex officio, on the committee and brings a counter-intelligence perspective to its deliberations where appropriate. If CFIUS determines that the proposed transaction poses a risk of some sort it may prohibit the transaction altogether or , far more frequently, it may enter into a mitigation agreement that puts in place mechanisms and requirements that it deems necessary to ameliorate the risk . Though CFIUS was initially created to focus on the sale of companies that would result in foreign control of defense-critical industries, in the post-9/11 world it has come , as well, to focus on sales that will effect critical infrastructure (such as the sale of port facilities to Dubai Ports World). This focus has, on at least one publicly acknowledged occasion, involved the review of a purchase that implicated cybersecurity concerns.
Page ° 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 832, * 2NC – Link Trick – BIT China’s strategy is to acquire semiconductor firms from US companies – the BIT simplifies that for the Chinese Mozur and Perlez 16 – (Paul Mozur writes about technology from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau. His coverage areas include companies such as Foxconn, Huawei and Tencent and industry topics such as social media, censorship and China's electronics supply chain; Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent in the Beijing bureau of The New York Times. She covers China and its foreign policy, particularly relations between
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