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Anat of Arg Worksheet II

Performance the fact that it has taken place is not a

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performance, the fact that it has taken place is not a proof of intention; [6] words for example may occur in somebody’s mind without his meaning them. So [7] intention is never a performance in the mind .... G. E. M. Anscombe Intention , p. 49 40. [1] Whatever is in motion must be moved by something else. Moreover, [2] this something else, if it too is in motion, must itself be moved by something else, and that in turn by yet another thing. But [3] this cannot go on forever, because [4] if it did there would be no first mover and hence no other mover. For [5] second movers do not move except when moved by a first mover, just as [6] a stick does not move anything except 4
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when moved by a hand. So [7] we must reach a first mover which is not moved by anything, which all men think of as God. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae , I, Pt. 1, qu. 2, a. 3 41. [1] It is plain that the immateriality of a thing is the reason that it can have knowledge, and the ability to know corresponds to the degree of immateriality. Hence it is said that on account of [2] their materiality [3] plants do not have knowledge. [4] The senses can know because [5] they receive the likeness of things without the matter. [6] The intellect is even more able to have knowledge because [7] it is more separated from matter and unmixed as Aristotle says. So since [8] God is immaterial to the highest degree, it follows that [9] He has knowledge to the highest degree. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae , I, Pt. 1, qu. 14, a. 1 42. It has been sufficiently pointed out that [1] the objects of mathematics are not substances in a higher sense than bodies are, and that [2] they are not prior to sensibles in being, but only in formula, and that [3] they cannot in any way exist separately. But since [4] they could not exist in sensibles either, it is plain that [5] they either do not exist at all or exist in a special way and therefore [6] do not exist without qualification. For [7] ‘exist’ has many senses. Aristotle Metaphysics, 1077b 43. [1] There is no case in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself: for [2] it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now [3] in efficient causes it is not possible to go one to infinity, because [4] in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several or one only. Now [5] to take a way the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, [6] if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But [7] if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; [8] all of which is plainly false. Therefore, [9] it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae 44. But [1] the Argument from First Cause is not a good reason to think that God exists. For [2] it begs the question.
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