Most routing protocols employ a id sequence number

Info icon This preview shows pages 53–55. Sign up to view the full content.

some useful applications in securing routing protocols. Most routing protocols employ a (ID, sequence number)-tuple to identify packets containing (different types of) routing information. When some node C receives a packet indicating a tuple ( A, q ), it generally updates its routing tables only if the sequence number q is higher than a previously seen routing information packet from A . In a scenario where A has released a packet with sequence number q it is desirable to have measures in place to ensure that no other node but A can create a packet with the tuple ( A, q ) with q > q . The PU hash chain schemes c do precisely that. A node with ID A chooses a secret K 0 A , and constructs a hash chain { K 0 A , K 1 A , . . . K L A 1 A } with the commitment K L A A . Note that unlike the TESLA chain, the elements of the PU hash chain are not associated with any absolute value of time or time-interval. Along with the first indexed message (sequence number 1) sent by A , A reveals the secret K L A 1 A . With message indexed 2, A reveals the secret K L A 2 A , and so on. As the secret is made public along with the message, the contents of the message cannot be authenticated using the secret. However, the fact that a value K L A i A accompanies some message indicating a tuple ( A, i ), provides an assurance to the verifier that node A has indeed released a routing message with sequence number i . c Such an approach is used in Ariadne 9 for thwarting Route-Request floods, as discussed later in this chapter. Copyright © 2010. World Scientific Publishing Company. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 2/16/2016 3:46 AM via CGC-GROUP OF COLLEGES (GHARUAN) AN: 340572 ; Beyah, Raheem, Corbett, Cherita, McNair, Janise.; Security in Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks Account: ns224671
Image of page 53

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

Key Distribution 41 3.2. ID Based Key Predistribution Schemes In ID-based key predistribution schemes (KPS) the KDC chooses a set of P master secrets S . Every mobile device is provided with k secrets. The set of k secrets S A assigned to a device with ID A is based on the ID A and the set of P KDC secrets S . Now A and B (with secrets S A and S B , respectively) can independently compute a pairwise secret K AB . Any one with access to secrets of v entities, say { O 1 · · · O v } , can obvi- ously compute any shared secret of the form K O i X for all 1 i v , for any X . However, by pooling together the secrets of entities { O 1 · · · O v } , one may also be able to , illegitimately compute shared secrets of the form K AB when neither A nor B belongs to the set { O 1 · · · O v } . In other words, scalable KPSs are susceptible to collusions . 3.2.1. Deterministic and Probabilistic KPSs Collusion susceptible scalable KPSs can be broadly classified into 1) n - secure deterministic KPSs; and 2) ( n, p )-secure probabilistic KPSs. An n - secure deterministic KPS can tolerate an attacker who has pooled together secrets from n nodes. In other words, for an n -secure deterministic KPS, the
Image of page 54
Image of page 55
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.
  • Spring '12
  • Kushal Kanwar
  • Public key infrastructure, ........., Public-key cryptography, Pretty Good Privacy

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

What students are saying

  • Left Quote Icon

    As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

    Student Picture

    Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

    Student Picture

    Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

    Student Picture

    Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern