In this case the aircraft took of tail heavy and was improperly rigged on the flight control cables. Apparently the work accomplished on the elevator system was done on the midnight shift early in the morning when the circadian rhythms would be low. The maintenance crew also had a long commute to the repair facility and had been working routinely long shifts. An interview was conducted that stated the mechanics lacked training and resources to accomplish the task. The mechanics had been working long shifts and had long commutes which decreased alertness and increased fatigue which ended up causing 21 deaths. (Air Midwest, 2012) The second case is ValuJet Flight Number 592 which occurred on May11, 1996 at 14:13. The aircraft was a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 heading toward Atlanta. It was scheduled to depart at 13:00, but was delayed. Finally taxiing out around 14:03 the aircraft received clearance from air traffic control and they finally took off at 14:04. Climbing quickly at around 14:10 the crew heard a sound and wondered what it was, and a few seconds later stated that there was an electrical problem. Only five seconds later to state that they had lost everything, the captain requested to turn back to Miami and that is when the cockpit voice recorder heard fire, fire, fire, fire in the background. Within seconds, the captain started to shout we’re on fire, we’re on fire and the controller instructed them to descend. The airplane was completely on fire by 14:11 and was stating that there was smoke in the cockpit as well as the cabin. By 14:12 the control tower had no response from Flight 592 and the flight data recorder had stopped recording. Fortunately,
ASCI 490 GROUP PROJECT ON FATIGUE 22 the airplane’s radar transponder was still transmitting and the air traffic controllers were able to obtain aircraft position and altitude. At 14:13 no further communication was established with the crew of Flight 592. It was determined that the aircraft had crashed into the Florida Everglades with a right wing down, nose down altitude. This catastrophic case led to 110 deaths which included five crew members and 105 passengers. (ValuJet, 2012) The probable causes of the accident were determined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB had stated that the fire in the Class D cargo compartment, in relation to the oxygen generators improperly placed and labeled, were caused by many factors which are: the failure of Sabre Tech to correctly package, label, and track the oxygen generators prior to giving the canisters to ValuJet for storage among the aircraft, the failure of ValuJet to comply with inspections on the contract maintenance program to make certain that maintenance, training, and hazardous materials were disposed of and stored correctly, as well as the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to make it necessary to equip the Class D cargo compartment with smoke detectors and fire suppression systems. ValuJet’s oversight of the
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