PCIBank issued a temporary restraining order for respondent judge to desist

Pcibank issued a temporary restraining order for

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PCIBank, issued a temporary restraining order for respondent judge to desist from conducting further proceedings in Special Proceedings Case No. 3215. [16] On December 17, 1990, PCIBank filed with the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition, [17] insisting that the enforcement of the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued by the trial court on December 13, 1990 could no longer be done in view of the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1990. On October 22, 1991, the Court of Appeals dismissed PCIBank’s petition and supplemental petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. [18] On December 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by PCIBank. [19] Hence, this petition. [20] At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11 in Special Proceedings Case No. 3215-90, pertaining to the claim of petitioner PCIBank. Petitioner submitted that such issuance was premature, because no answer was filed yet and the issues had not been joined. Petitioner also contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ because it effectively determined the question of ownership over the property, which question was beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. Moreover, the writ was issued despite the prior issuance by the appellate court of a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from continuing its proceedings. According to respondents, petitioner’s insistence that the hearing on the application for injunctive writ should not proceed due to the non-joinder of issues was a mere delaying tactic intended to force the lapse of the redemption period on December 20, 1990, thus rendering the right of redemption moot and academic. Respondents denied raising any issue of ownership because the titles to the property unquestionably belonged to Blanquita Ang as the legal heir and surviving widow of Jose Ang, and the titles to the foreclosed property had not been consolidated in the name of petitioner bank. Respondents also emphasized that all the documents submitted by petitioner evidencing the real estate mortgages and foreclosure thereof contained forged signatures of Blanquita Ang. In several documents, she was not even included as party to the transaction. Thus, she was not bound by the agreement entered into by the decedent Jose Ang, Sr. and petitioner bank.
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The petition lacks merit. Petitioner claims that it was not given sufficient opportunity to file an answer in opposition to the application for preliminary injunction due to its belated receipt of the complaint-in-intervention. Such contention is untenable. Since it received a copy of the complaint-in-intervention on November 23, 1990, there was ample time to prepare an answer for the hearing set on December 4, 1990.
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