PCIBank, issued a temporary restraining order for respondent judge to desistfrom conducting further proceedings in Special Proceedings Case No. 3215.On December 17, 1990, PCIBank filed with the Court of Appeals aSupplemental Petition,insisting that the enforcement of the writ of preliminaryprohibitory injunction issued by the trial court on December 13, 1990 could nolonger be done in view of the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals onDecember 12, 1990.On October 22, 1991, the Court of Appeals dismissed PCIBank’s petition andsupplemental petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction.On December 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion forreconsideration filed by PCIBank.Hence, this petition.At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the issuance of awrit of preliminary injunction by the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11in Special Proceedings Case No. 3215-90, pertaining to the claim of petitionerPCIBank.Petitioner submitted that such issuance was premature, because no answerwas filed yet and the issues had not been joined. Petitioner also contended thatthe trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ because it effectivelydetermined the question of ownership over the property, which question wasbeyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. Moreover, the writ was issueddespite the prior issuance by the appellate court of a temporary restraining orderenjoining the trial court from continuing its proceedings.According to respondents, petitioner’s insistence that the hearing on theapplication for injunctive writ should not proceed due to the non-joinder of issueswas a mere delaying tactic intended to force the lapse of the redemption periodon December 20, 1990, thus rendering the right of redemption moot andacademic. Respondents denied raising any issue of ownership because the titles to theproperty unquestionably belonged to Blanquita Ang as the legal heir andsurviving widow of Jose Ang, and the titles to the foreclosed property had notbeen consolidated in the name of petitioner bank. Respondents also emphasized that all the documents submitted by petitionerevidencing the real estate mortgages and foreclosure thereof contained forgedsignatures of Blanquita Ang. In several documents, she was not even includedas party to the transaction. Thus, she was not bound by the agreement enteredinto by the decedent Jose Ang, Sr. and petitioner bank.
The petition lacks merit. Petitioner claims that it was not given sufficient opportunity to file an answerin opposition to the application for preliminary injunction due to its belatedreceipt of the complaint-in-intervention. Such contention is untenable. Since itreceived a copy of the complaint-in-intervention on November 23, 1990, therewas ample time to prepare an answer for the hearing set on December 4, 1990.