***The permutation severs ‘engagement’---it requires unconditionality---the counterplan is a distinct, non-topical, strategy Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement , May, Available Online at , Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23) First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state . The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links , and encouraging trade and investment in particular . Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19 ‘Conditionality’, in contrast , is the linking , by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfillment of economic and/or political conditions . ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached ; conditionality attaches the strings . In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy . This distinction guarantees aff ground---there are unique advantages and disadvantages to each strategy Donno 13 (Daniela is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, Ph.D. from Yale University, expert on international organizations and norms, with a particular focus on the international influences on elections and human rights, “Defending Democratic Norms”, Oxford University Press, pg. 29 – 33)//ghs-gk When responding to flawed elections, international actors have a range of tools at their disposal . Enforcement —defined broadly as efforts to improve compliance with democratic norms through pressure, incentives, or suasion— can include policy tools that marshal both material and social incentives . "Thus, rather than making an artificial assumption that actors are motivated by either material calculations or ideational forces, 1 integrate rationalist and constructivist perspectives. 1 assume that the choices of domestic actors can be swayed both by a logic of consequences—whereby actors calculate the costs and benefits of their actions—and by a logic of appropriateness—whereby actors seek to conform to socially accepted standards of behavior (March and Olsen 1998). "
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- Winter '16
- Jeff Hannan
- International Relations