traffic Dickens was driving and suffered an epileptic seizure because he didnt

Traffic dickens was driving and suffered an epileptic

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traffic, Dickens was driving and suffered an epileptic seizure because he didn’t take his medication, he entered the worksite and hit a kettle containing hot liquid enamel that splattered onto π’s face and body.Def: This was a freakish accident brought on solely by Dickens’ negligence, there is no causal link between Felix’s breach of duty and π’s injury. Dickens’ negligence supersedes Felix’s and breaks the causal chain.Court: This accident was within the scope of the risk of Felix’s negligence. A prime hazard of the contractor’s negligence in failing to safeguard the excavation site was that a driver might negligently enter the work site and injure a worker. This was high on the list of risks that made ∆ negligent. EXAMPLE: Defective truck driver pulls over, is hit by another car. Manufacturer is but-for cause, but did this accident flow from the original negligence? Was this within the scope of risks that made ∆ negligent?Note: While the Derdiarian accident may have been unforeseeable in its particulars, π need not demonstrate that the precise manner of the accident or the extent of injuries were foreseeable. Barry v. Quality Steel:π injured by defective roof brackets that gave way and caused him to fall fromthe roof, but π did not use the correct strength of nail suggested by manufacturer and employer violated OSHA regulations by not providing fall protection.Court rejects superseding cause in favor of proximate cause. The test is whether it is within the scope of risks.Two intervening causes-- 1. wrong nail size, 2. no safety net.Superseding cause is problematic because it cuts off liability based on subsequent conduct of another negligent actor, even though the initial actor was negligent. Court says that the adoption of comparative negligence clears this up. It is clear that the state doesn’t want to cut off liability for negligent defendants, but would rather allocate according to percentage of fault. However, comparative fault does not help when you are at fault but not a proximate cause. All parties must have been a proximate cause of the injury/accident for this reasoning to hold. Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R. Co.:∆ negligently allowed gasoline to escape from railroad car and collect in the street; a bystander threw a match into the pool of gasoline and caused an explosion. Did he throw the match accidentally or intentionally into the pools? Did he know whathe was doing?Manner of the harm: π is foreseeable, harm of fire is foreseeable, why shouldn’t he be liable either way? Is this just the instrumentality of harm?Policy: Do we want to hold def liable for the risk of arsonists? Arsonists are a fire waiting tohappen.
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But see,case notes involving liability for intentional criminal acts: Hollenbeck(pager co. held liable where police officer was criminally assaulted while effecting arrests and his pager failed to send warning messages to precinct), Medcalf
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