In
this situation the accused's single act
must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that
he intended to join
the larger conspiracy.
The
state argues that the defendant's participa-
tion in the single wrongful activity
is
sufficient evidence of his intent to
promote the goals of the conspiracy beyond
that
one occasion.
Courts
faced with prosecutions utilizing this line of argument often have sent
the issue
to
the jurors to determine whether they can infer from the
single act the requisite intent to join the larger conspiracy.
The
diffi-
culty with this approach is that the jury often finds, from the single
transaction, not only the defendant's intent to join the larger agreement,
but
also the intent
to
foster the broad goals of
that
agreement.
This
finding, however,
is
made on the basis of a single act, and although the
act
is
criminal in itself, it offers little evidence as
to
the state of mind of
the defendant in relation to the other defendants and the larger con-
spiracy.
Recently some courts have become reluctant to sustain convictions
in
these single-act cases.
Although the courts recognize
that
in many
cases prosecutors can convict true conspirators only through such evi-
dence, the courts are genuinely and justifiably reluctant to allow convic-
tions in the one transaction situation to stand.
In
United States
v.
Sperling
52
the defendant, Garcia, violated the narcotics laws
on
a single
occasion
by
delivering illegal drugs
to
a member of a larger ongoing
conspiracy.
Garcia argued that "there was insufficient evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that [he was] aware that the scope
of
the conspiracy was larger
than
[his] participation
....
"
53
Noting
that
the delivery of cocaine, by itself,
on
one occasion, was
"not
the kind
of
single transaction which itself supports
an
inference of knowledge of
a broader conspiracy on the part of [Garcia],"
54
the court recognized
the
possibility that some single acts might
be
sufficient evidence of
participation in a conspiracy.
For
a single act to
be
sufficient to draw
an
actor within the ambit
of a conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws, there must
be
Pinkerton
Court held that one could be liable
for substantive crimes
if the crimes were
committed in furtherance
of
the agreement as understood by the parties and if the crimes
were reasonably foreseeable to the parties.
52.
506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974).
53.
ld.
at
1342.
54.
Id.
No.3]
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
639
independent evidence tending to prove that the defendant in ques-
tion had some knowledge of the broader conspiracy,
or
the single
act itself must be one from which such knowledge may be in-
ferred.
56
The type of single act that the court in
Sperling
said could be the
basis for the necessary inference is not entirely clear.
