17The trial court gave petitioners twenty-four(24) hours to answer the motion. Hearing thereon was scheduled on March 30, 1989. LibLexHowever, on March 29, 1989, petitioners Eled with the Court of Appeals a Petitionfor Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamusto annul the Orders of the trial court datedMarch 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989. 1818On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in theform of a temporary restraining order (TRO).On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ ofpreliminary injunction upon Eling by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00. 19However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminaryinjunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that as the complaint for replevin Eledby private respondents complied with the requirements of an aAdavit and bond underSecs. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevinwas mandatory. 2020As for the contempt charges against petitioners, the Court of Appeals believedthe same were suAciently based on a written charge by private respondents and thereport submitted by the Sheriff. 21On April 25, 1990, petitioners Eled a motion for reconsideration of the foregoingdecision. However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution datedMay 18, 1990. 22Hence this petition.On the one hand, petitioners contend, thus:(1)"Confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin". 23(2)"Petitioners not compelled to criminally prosecute privaterespondents but may opt only to confiscate lumber". 24(3)"Private respondent charged criminally in court". 25andCD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018cdasiaonline.com
(4)"Writ of Replevin issued in contravention of PD #605". 26On the other hand, private respondents argue that:(1)"The respondent Judge had jurisdiction to take cognizance of thecomplaint for recovery of personal property and, therefore, hadjurisdiction to issue the necessary orders in connection therewith." 27(2)"The issuance of the order for the delivery of personal property uponapplication, aAdavit and Eling of replevin bond by the plaintiff ismandatory and not discretionary, hence, no abuse of discretion can becommitted by the trial court in the issuance thereof." 28(3)"The Order of March 20, 1989 was in accordance with Section 4, Rule60 of the Rules of Court and is, therefore, valid." 29(4)"The private respondents have not been proven to have violatedSection 68 of the Revised Forestry Code." 30(5)"The petitioners do not have the authority to keep privaterespondents' property for an indeEnite period, more so, to dispose ofthe same without notice and hearing or without due process." 31(6)"Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, no formal investigation wasconducted by the PIC with respect to the subject lumber in this case."32(7)"The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitionerSecretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is not valid and doesnot make the issuance of the order of replevin illegal." 33and(8)"The subject properties were not in custody of the law and may bereplevied." 34At the outset we observe that herein respondents never appealed the conEscationorder of petitioner Secretary to the OAce of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D.
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