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PH100 Lecture Notes

Dennett qualia are not intrinsic depends on other

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Dennett: Qualia are not intrinsic – depends on other things
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Intuition pump #15: the guitar string p. 243, right column Open E vs. harmonic “...it would be a mistake to transform the fact that inevitably there is a limit to our capacity to describe things we experience into the supposition that there are absolutely indescribable properties in our experience” (244). Dennett: our experiences are not ineffable Conclusion “So when we look one last time at our original characterization of qualia as ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience, we find that there is nothing to fill the bill...So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all” (244). October 18, 2012: Personal Identity Intuition pump #1: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde Intuition pump #2: Traveling to Mars Question: Have you been teleported to Mars? Or has the teleporter killed you and then recreated you on Mars? Intuition pump #3: Body or mind switch? Question: Am I in someone else's body or did my psychological character change so much that I remember to be someone else? Issue of personal identity: What makes you the same person over time? Question/issue of numerical identity Two types of identity: qualitative and numerical identity Qualitative identity Two billiard balls look identical; they have the same characteristics but they are NOT one in the same Numerical identity Billiard ball 1, at time t & Billiard ball 1, at time t + 1 There is just one billiard ball Importance of personal identity 1. We are concerned about our future – not someone else's future. We are concerned about what will happen to us. We have certain expectations, dreams, and hopes because we assume that our future self will be numerically identical to our present self. 2. Personal identity is closely tied to issues of punishment and justice. It is unfair to punish someone who is not numerically identical to the wrongdoer. 3. Personal identity is constitutive of our understanding of certain emotions. For instance, the idea of regret requires personal identity. To answer question, need sufficient condition: if P is true, then X and Y are numerically identical Four possible candidates: 1. Sameness of matter: If X's matter is the same as Y's matter, then X and Y are numerically identical. 2. Soul: If X's soul is the same as Y's soul, then X and Y are numerically identical. 3. Spatiotemporal continuity: If there is spatiotemporal continuity between X and Y, then X and Y are numerically identical. 4. Psychological continuity: If there is psychological continuity between X and Y, then X and Y are
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numerically identical. Problems with candidates: 1. Sameness of matter: does not seem to be a sufficient condition for identity Intuition pump #1: is the professor identical to the roller derby professional? They have nothing in common Intuition pump #2: Did the teleporter kill you?
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