N egociations internationales bien public n etats n

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Application. N´ egociations internationales / Bien public n ´ Etats n´ egocient le niveau de leur ´ emission de pollution s i 0 . L’utilit´ e du pays i est u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = v ( s i ) n summationdisplay j =1 s j o`u v > 0 > v ′′ et v (0) > 1
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Application. N´ egociations internationales / Bien public n ´ Etats n´ egocient le niveau de leur ´ emission de pollution s i 0 . L’utilit´ e du pays i est u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = v ( s i ) n summationdisplay j =1 s j o`u v > 0 > v ′′ et v (0) > 1 , par exemple, v ( x ) = ln( x )
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Application. N´ egociations internationales / Bien public n ´ Etats n´ egocient le niveau de leur ´ emission de pollution s i 0 . L’utilit´ e du pays i est u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = v ( s i ) n summationdisplay j =1 s j o`u v > 0 > v ′′ et v (0) > 1 , par exemple, v ( x ) = ln( x ) Chaque joueur a une action dominante ∂u i ∂s i ( s ) = 0 v ( s i ) = 1
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Application. N´ egociations internationales / Bien public n ´ Etats n´ egocient le niveau de leur ´ emission de pollution s i 0 . L’utilit´ e du pays i est u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = v ( s i ) n summationdisplay j =1 s j o`u v > 0 > v ′′ et v (0) > 1 , par exemple, v ( x ) = ln( x ) Chaque joueur a une action dominante ∂u i ∂s i ( s ) = 0 v ( s i ) = 1 EN unique et sym´ etrique : chaque joueur choisit l’action dominante s i qui v´ erifie v ( s i ) = 1 . Par exemple, si v ( x ) = ln( x ) alors s = (1 , . . . , 1)
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Profil d’actions s = ( s i ) i qui maximise le bien-ˆ etre social
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Profil d’actions s = ( s i ) i qui maximise le bien-ˆ etre social n summationdisplay i =1 u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = n summationdisplay i =1 v ( s i ) n n summationdisplay j =1 s j
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Profil d’actions s = ( s i ) i qui maximise le bien-ˆ etre social n summationdisplay i =1 u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = n summationdisplay i =1 v ( s i ) n n summationdisplay j =1 s j est tel que pour tout k , n i =1 u i ∂s k ( s ) = 0 , c’est-` a-dire, v ( s k ) = n
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Profil d’actions s = ( s i ) i qui maximise le bien-ˆ etre social n summationdisplay i =1 u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = n summationdisplay i =1 v ( s i ) n n summationdisplay j =1 s j est tel que pour tout k , n i =1 u i ∂s k ( s ) = 0 , c’est-` a-dire, v ( s k ) = n L’EN est Pareto domin´ e
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Profil d’actions s = ( s i ) i qui maximise le bien-ˆ etre social n summationdisplay i =1 u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = n summationdisplay i =1 v ( s i ) n n summationdisplay j =1 s j est tel que pour tout k , n i =1 u i ∂s k ( s ) = 0 , c’est-` a-dire, v ( s k ) = n L’EN est Pareto domin´ e v ′′ < 0 v ց ⇒ s i > s i : ` a l’´ equilibre, les ´ Etats polluent trop
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Taux de taxe θ :
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Th´ eorie des jeux Jeux sous forme normale Taux de taxe θ : u i ( s 1 , . . . , s n ) = v ( s i ) n summationdisplay j =1 s j θs i + 1 n n summationdisplay j =1 θs j
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Th´ eorie des jeux
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