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Unformatted text preview: Instead, let us first examine why explicitly racist attitudes are problematic and then consider whether the same story can be told about implicit attitudes. Why are explicit racist attitudes morally problematic? Garcia: Racism is a deformation of affect and the will. Explicit racist attitudes are morally problematic because they are opposed to benevolence and justice. Benevolence: Disposition to do good, desire to promote the happiness of others, kindness, generosity, charitable feeling. Justice: The quality of treating everyone justly (equally, unless there are morally relevant reasons); to be fair. Suggestion: implicit attitudes will be morally problematic, if they are opposed to benevolence and justice. Question: are implicit attitudes opposed to benevolence and justice? Kelly and Roeddert: It isn't clear how to answer this question. Blum: Explicit racist attitudes are morally problematic because (a) they involve stereotyping a certain group of people and (b) stereotyping can be disrespectful for it fails to appreciate another person's full humanity Suggestion: implicit attitudes will be morally problematic, if they fail to appreciate one's full humanity What is wrong vs. what is morally blameworthy A person might not be morally blameworthy for harboring certain implicit racial attitudes (especially, in the case in which the acquisition of such attitudes is automatic and uncontrollable). We might still want to say that implicit racial attitudes are wrong. What to do? Suppose that we do harbor racial implicit attitudes. What shall we do in response? Example of a White professor grading a Black student's paper should the professor take into account his implicit racial bias when grading? December 6, 2012: Outlaw Emotions Emotions need to be controlled or directed by reason. Platonic view Reason mental, public, universal, male, objective, absolute, aperspectival, active Emotions bodily, private, particular, female, irrational, subjective, perspectival, passive Emotions as obstacles to knowledge (more extreme view) Question: What are emotions, epistemological states? Question: What is the relationship between knowledge and emotion? Jaggar's aim: In this essay, I wish to being bridging this gap [the gap between emotions and knowledge] through the suggestion that emotions may be helpful and even necessary rather than inimical to the construction of knowledge (146-7). The nature of emotions, according to Jaggar: 1. Emotions are not mere feelings nor involuntary bodily movements. On such accounts, emotions were not seen as being about anything: instead, they were contrasted with and seen as potential disruptions of other phenomena that are about some thing, phenomena, such as rational judgements, thoughts, and observations (148) Dumb view of Emotions 2. Cognitivist accounts of emotions are also problematic....
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- Fall '10
- Turing, intuition pump