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Dom which is the ground of being and time however

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dom which is ‘‘the ground of being and time.’’∞≥∏However much Heidegger has gone beyond Kant in this transcendental-ontologicalconcept of freedom, it remains as the ‘‘condition of possibility’’ forthe realm of the experiential, for all that comes to appearance and disclosurewithin the world—that is, for all that isbeing[Seiendes]. And it is in this regardthat, following Kant’s canon for the validity and intelligibility of the relation-ship, Fink makes his critical observations on Heidegger’s program. Fink findsright here that what passes for radical explication in fundamental ontologyreally amounts to interpreting that-which-makes-possible—i.e., the condi-tioningfactor—in terms of that-which-is made-possible—i.e., the conditionedfactor. (See 3.3.2.) That is, the lineaments of the conditioning factor are drawnin accord with and following the features of that which is conditioned by it.Now it may be that this procedure is unavoidable, and perhapsin principleunavoidable; but not explicitly to draw out the philosophical implications ofthe methodological order whereby the relation in the move of disclosive regressinverts the order of the relation of conditioning itself, is to remain in an un-critical naïveté. The situation is similar in principle to that for the analysisof temporality, where, as Fink puts it, ‘‘genetic elucidation leads into self-temporalizing time’’ rather than a move back into ‘‘the intra-temporal past.’’ Inother words, to inquire into genesis is to inquire into time’s temporalization,into ‘‘the process of the bringing about of temporality [die Zeitigung derZeit].’’ But in conceptualizing this ‘‘proto-happening that first makes all hap-pening possible,’’ we meet the procedure of ‘‘retro-application [Rücklage].’’That is, though ‘‘time’s temporalization’’ cannot be itself a ‘‘happening,’’ i.e.,in134. EFA U-MH-V 51; MH-GA 31, p. 135.135. EFA U-MH-V 132; cf. Wgm, p. 85. Heidegger’s address was on December 11,1930.136. EFA U-MH-V 51; MH-GA 31, p. 135.
170Who Is Phenomenology?time, nevertheless it can only be described by ‘‘retro-applying [Rücklegung] [toit] that which is made possible by it.’’∞≥πThis critical point was indicated earlier (3.3.2 and 3.4), but here it takes onanother note. Rather than simply a move of improper attribution, this ‘‘retro-application’’ begins to have to play a positive role, as a kind of ‘‘malum neces-sarium.’’ As Heidegger himself make clear in his discussion of Kant in thesummer lectures of 1930,∞≥∫this is tied to the fact that any critical philosophi-cal reflection has to begin with some pregiven set of phenomena to be studiedand some pregiven schema of conceptualization with which to thematize andexplore them; or, put another way, the order of conditioning and structuringphenomena is inverse to the order of the move of explanatory regression inknowing.

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