Article 176 as regards the powers functions and most

Article 176 as regards the powers, functions (and most important) the rights of Inspector Kanda . I should perhaps
add that a diligent search of the Government Gazettes has not disclosed the fresh appointment after Merdeka Day
of respondent or Carbonell. Even applying the interpretation submitted by the Attorney-General cannot the

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GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA v SURINDER SINGH KANDA
respondent justifiably say, "by virtue of Articles 176 and 141 I am under the sole jurisdiction of the Commission
since concurrent jurisdictions are not possible?" I think he can. I would, however, point out that if the Attorney-
General's construction is applied to Article 176 the words "and subject to existing law" are meaningless because
they already exist in the last lines of Article 176.
To come now to the question of the powers of Carbonell, the record gives me no assistance as in the case of
Kanda . If I am permitted, which I doubt, to have reference to the Government Gazettes, then he is in the same
position as Kanda in which case if you use the interpretation of the Attorney-General he has by virtue of Article 140
lost his power unless you can have concurrent jurisdictions because his power under Article 176 is subject to the
restriction imposed by Article 140. In any case, it is unanswerable that Carbonell's powers must be dependent on
whether his appointment is pre-merdeka or post-merdeka by His Majesty. If it be the latter, it seems to me the
interpretation of the learned Attorney-General would leave the Court in the dilemma of having to decide the answer
to the question of priority as between chicken and the egg, or as between the clear constitutional rights of Kanda
and according to the learned Attorney-General the clear power of the Commissioner of Police Carbonell. I cannot
conceive that the learned draftsmen of the Constitution intended this and it seems to me I am forced to reject the
interpretation put forward by the learned Attorney-General and to seek another interpretation. The interpretation I
have given of the relevant phrase besides giving effect to all the words used in Article 176 solves this dilemma.
I have not overlooked the fact that if my interpretation be correct then it would mean that constitutionally the Police
Service Commission in this particular case would have to deal with every minor disciplinary offence committed by
any member of the police force. That, of course, must be admitted but in my opinion it is not (as submitted by
Attorney General) a factor which affects the otherwise clear meaning of the Constitution read in toto. This is made
even clearer when one notes the power of delegation given to all Commissions in the Constitution. It clearly
establishes, to my mind, that the persons responsible for the Constitution foresaw this particular difficulty and
inserted the powers to delegate to cover the position. In fact, one could go further since it is the Constitution which
is being interpreted and say that the Constitution clearly intends that there should be a delegation.