But how can the appearance of solipsism come about Obviously only by

But how can the appearance of solipsism come about

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But how can the appearance of solipsism come about? Obviously only by artificially suspending the hidden intentionality of the founding mun- dane intersubjectivity and eliminating, by means of the reduction, the essential content of the world accepted by me as a world for everyone. Neither the fact that the world, even in its reduced status as transcenden- tal phenomenon, is a world of all of us, nor the facts that my experience of the world refers a priori to Others, requires explanation. What does require clarification is the desperate attempt to escape from the appear- ance of solipsism by introducing the second epoche leading to the pri- mordial sphere—since it is precisely this attempt which gives rise to that appearance (p. 83). ( 2 ) But Schutz’s criticism of the Husserlian account of transcendental inter- subjectivity goes even further. He not only casts doubt on the single steps
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Gros 234 Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 48 (2017) 214–239 taken by Husserl to solve the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, but also puts into question the philosophical pertinence of the problem itself. To put it in Helmut Wagner’s words (1983, p. 313), the late Schutz “began to view Husserl’s problem of ‘transcendental intersubjectivity’ no longer as a problem of intersubjectivity; rather, formulation and presupposition of the ‘problem’ were in doubt”. More precisely, in the Royaumont paper, Schutz (1970, p. 82) argues that in- tersubjectivity is not to be understood as a problem to be solved by means of “transcendental constitutional analysis”, but rather as “the fundamental onto- logical category of human existence in the world and therefore of all philo- sophical anthropology” (p. 82). Indeed, for Schutz (in Wagner, 1983, p. 304), the only viable habitat for sociality is not the transcendental sphere, but the everyday lifeworld. On this account, intersubjectivity is, quite simply, an ines- capable “datum [ Gegebenheit ] of the lifeworld” that has to be taken as a given by both philosophers and social scientists (Schutz, 1970, p. 82). Arguably, late Schutz’s main fundamental objection to Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity rests on his above-mentioned “creationist” interpretation of the transcendental method of constitution. According to the Vienesse thinker, what Husserl attempts to do in the 5th Meditation is to “constitute intersub- jectivity in the sense of the creation of a universe of monads” within the tran- scendental subjectivity of the meditating philosopher (Schutz, 1970, p. 90, 84. My emphasis). Now, in Schutz’s view (p. 90), insofar as Husserl tries to “found the existence of the social world on constitutive operations of the consciousness”, he makes an “extravagant use” of the transcendental constitutive analysis. More pre- cisely, the attempt to show how my isolated subjectivity can create or produce other subjectivities is for Schutz a speculative move that lacks any philosophi- cal pertinence. This becomes visible, for instance, in a rhetorical—and, in my
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