This preview shows page 237 - 239 out of 256 pages.
But if theUnited States wants to respond directly to the rise of the AIIB, thenthe Obamaadministration and Congress will need to shift their focus.Yes, further progress on World Bank governance reform will be helpful and necessary in the years ahead, but the United States has less to give here than do key European countries.Instead, what theUnited States can provide through existing multilateral development banks(MDBs) such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank is the same thing the Chinese are now providing through the AIIB: more capital for infrastructure spending. This is hardly a secret. China and other emerging-market countries have been calling for more capital at the World Bank and ADB for years, and the US-supported capital increases of 2010 have not kept pace withthe demand for infrastructure spending.Unfortunately, the United States has been the voice of opposition when it comes to calls for more MDB capital. But if theUnited States wants to limit the ambitions of emergent development institutions like the AIIB where US influence is limited, then it has to demonstrate greater ambition in the existing MDBs. TheUnited States can choose to forge a pro-development partnership with China through the MDBs(old and new), or it can continue to stand on the sidelines as China pursues new partnerships elsewhere.Congress could pass IMF reform tomorrow, and the United States would still be facing this critical choice in the world of the MDBs.
2nc Solves China RiseThe CP solves China’s rise --- reverses perception of containmentHarris, 15--- Economy, Trade, and Business Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (last modified on 8/7/2015, Tobias, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, “The U.S. Response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” , downloaded 6/1/16, JMP)U.S. officials have, for years, called upon China to act as a “responsible stakeholder,”8 a country that, in then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words, “[recognizes] that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.” However, theUnited States has not been as sensitive when it comes to multilateral political andeconomic institution building. Instead, Washington has, at times, seemed content to permit the emergence of “rival regionalisms.”9 Rather than welcome a greater Chinese role in regional institutions, challenging Beijing to act as a responsible stakeholder, theUnited States has seemed, at best, resigned and, at worst, hostile to China’s efforts to create its own institutions outside the existing regional architecture. While China has its own reasons for wanting to build new regional institutions, Washington has failed to use multilateral organizations as a means to give China a greater stake in the existing order and to counter the argument that the United States seeks to contain or otherwise limit China’s power in Asia.