The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because he could not

The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted

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transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution’s. The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because he could not have rendered the decision without the transcripts in question. Does the petitioner deprived of his right to speedy trial? Answer: No. An accused’s silence for a long time would be interpreted as a waiver of his right to speedy trial. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right—a situation amounting to laches—had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right. Dacanay v People. Administrative complaint filed by Retired Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juan S. Luzarraga against Judge Amaro M. Meteoro, for serious misconduct, gross inefficiency and neglect of duty for prolonging the rendering of decision. On the other hand, Judge Meteoro reason that he was burdened with a heavy caseload and is a stroke victim. However, it is a rule that when circumstances arise that would prevent the judge from disposing a case within the reglementary period, all that he has to do is to file an application with the Court asking for a reasonable extension of time within which to
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resolve the case. However, the record of this administrative matter does not show that respondent made an attempt to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending. Does the petitioner deprived of his right to speedy trial? Answer: Yes. The public trust character of a judge’s office imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. Thus, any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no matter how insignificant the case may seem to a judge, is, at bottom, delay in the administration of justice in general. The suffering endured by just one person—whether plaintiff, defendant, or accused—while awaiting a judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty, or property, taints the entire judiciary’s performance in its solemn task of administering justice. The failure to render a decision within the 90-day period constitutes serious misconduct in derogation of the speedy administration of justice. Luzarraga v Meteoro. This is a complaint against Judge Maxwel R. Rosete, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, incompetence, and impropriety, for dismissing with prejudice a criminal case for falsification of a private document filed by complainant for not being present in the hearing. Complainant claims that the prosecution’s motion for postponement of
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