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transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution’s.The respondent trial judge can hardly be faultedeither because he could not have rendered thedecision without the transcripts in question.Does the petitioner deprived of his right tospeedy trial?Answer:No. An accused’s silence for a long time wouldbe interpreted as a waiver of his right to speedy trial. It isfair to assume that he would have just continued to sleepon his right—a situation amounting to laches—had therespondent judge not taken the initiative of determiningthe non-completion of the records and of ordering theremedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. Thematter could have taken a different dimension if duringall those ten years when the case was reraffled, theaccused showed signs of asserting his right, or at leastmade some overt act (like a motion for early dispositionor a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribestenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is,his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver ofsuch right. Dacanay v People.Administrative complaint filed by RetiredAssistant Provincial Fiscal Juan S. Luzarragaagainst Judge Amaro M. Meteoro, for seriousmisconduct, gross inefficiency and neglect ofduty for prolonging the rendering of decision. Onthe other hand, Judge Meteoro reason that hewas burdened with a heavy caseload and is astroke victim. However, it is a rule that whencircumstances arise that would prevent thejudge from disposing a case within thereglementary period, all that he has to do is tofile an application with the Court asking for areasonable extension of time within which to
resolve the case. However, the record of thisadministrative matter does not show thatrespondent made an attempt to make such arequest. Instead, he preferred to keep the casepending. Does the petitioner deprived of his rightto speedy trial?Answer:Yes. The public trust character of a judge’soffice imposes upon him the highest degree ofresponsibility in the discharge of his obligation topromptly administer justice. Thus, any delay in thedetermination or resolution of a case, no matter howinsignificant the case may seem to a judge, is, at bottom,delay in the administration of justice in general. Thesuffering endured by just one person—whether plaintiff,defendant, or accused—while awaiting a judgment thatmay affect his life, honor, liberty, or property, taints theentire judiciary’s performance in its solemn task ofadministering justice. The failure to render a decisionwithin the 90-day period constitutes serious misconductin derogation of the speedy administration of justice.Luzarraga v Meteoro.This is a complaint against Judge Maxwel R.Rosete, for gross ignorance of the law, graveabuse of authority, incompetence, andimpropriety, for dismissing with prejudice acriminal case for falsification of a privatedocument filed by complainant for not beingpresent in the hearing. Complainant claims thatthe prosecution’s motion for postponement of