Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War | Quotes

Laitin and Fearon summarize the common misconceptions about the risk of civil war in certain countries. Many scholars assume that ethnic and religious differences lead to civil war. Laitin and Fearon argue that the conditions that support insurgency are better predictors of civil war.

Laitin and Fearon note that the recruitment of rebels is most successful in states with financial or bureaucratic weakness. Difficult physical landscape, political insecurity, and large populations also help the cause of rebels.

Laitin and Fearon explain that during the years 1945 to 1999, civil wars killed more people than international wars. Laitin and Fearon found that civil wars killed 16.2 million people while conflicts between different nations killed approximately 3.33 million.

Laitin and Fearon outline how they use data to study civil war. The data was from the years of 1945–99. They used data from 161 countries that all had a population of at least half a million in 1990.

One of the central points of Laitin and Fearon's article is that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not cause the civil wars of the 1990s. They note that scholars, policymakers, and news media incorrectly assume that the fall of the Soviet Union caused them.

Laitin and Fearon's hypothesis is that the primary factors that lead to civil war are conditions that favor rebels. These conditions allow rebels to escape, hide, and meet away from the counterinsurgency.

Laitin and Fearon argue that states with poor or weak central governments create conditions that benefit rebels. These weak governments are more likely to have dishonest police or government security forces. These factors enable insurgencies to thrive.

Laitin and Fearon note specific factors that benefit the insurgency. Landscapes like mountains, forests, or swamps allow rebels to hide from counterinsurgent forces. Connections in and knowledge of the local population also work in rebels' favor.

According to Laitin and Fearon, successful insurgencies do not need large numbers of people. Civil wars may start with a small group of rebels with serious and widely shared grievances.

Laitin and Fearon explain that because of their significantly smaller size, insurgents must be mobile and disappear. The superior numbers of government forces would make insurgents unlikely to survive sustained conflict.

Laitin and Fearon describe some of the characteristics of successful counterinsurgency. Government forces must be careful to correctly identify regular villagers from rebels. If government forces, kill, injure, harm, or worsen daily life for noncombatants, it can lead to increased support of rebels and provide opportunities for rebels to recruit former noncombatants.

Laitin and Fearon discover that per capita income is a significant predictor of civil war. Poverty and the conditions it creates makes people more likely to join insurgencies. Laitin and Fearon explain that low per capita income is a secondary indicator of the weakness of the state. Many times this weakness prevents the development of infrastructure such as roads and which makes it easier for forces to hide.

Laitin and Fearon again discuss how local knowledge gives insurgents an advantage. Firsthand information about the village or local community enables rebels to punish locals who inform on rebel actions.

Laitin and Fearon note that civil war allows for the collection of resentments and anger. Rebels are able to use this to their advantage and can often win local support. The authors note that it seems to be a strategy intentionally used by rebels.

Laitin and Fearon conclude the article with recommendations to international organizations. They recommend an increase in oversight of states involved in counterinsurgencies. International aid must be given to these governments only if their counterinsurgent actions are not driving local people to join the insurgency.