Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 1
Due April 9, Wednesday
1. Chapter 2, Problem 3 a)
Figure SOL2.3.1 1
a
b
c
2
2
2
x
y
x
y
x
y
3
3
high
low high
low
b)
Figure SOL2.3.2 1
a
b
c
2
2
2
x
y
x
y
x
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 1
Due April 16, Wednesday
1. Chapter 4, Problem 5 2. Chapter 4, Problem 8 3. Chapter 4, Problem 9 4. Chapter 4, Problem 10 5. Chapter 5, Problem 2 6. Chapter 5, Problem 3
ECON 601 Midterm
(April 28, Monday) Please write down all your answers in the distributed books. Be precise and concise. Please make your handwriting eligible. Good luck! 1. (30 points) A two player game is described by the following matrix: Player 1
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 6
Due May 28, Wednesday
1. Chapter 10, Problem 5 2. Chapter 11, Problem 5 3. Chapter 11, Problem 9
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 1
Due April 9, Wednesday
1. Chapter 2, Problem 3 2. Chapter 2, Problem 5 3. Chapter 2, Problem 7 4. Chapter 2, Problem 8 5. Chapter 3, Problem 1 6. Chapter 3, Problem 3
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 4
Due May 14, Wednesday
1. Chapter 7, Problem 3 2. Chapter 7, Problem 11 3. Chapter 8, Problem 2 4. Chapter 8, Problem 5 5. Chapter 8, Problem 8 6. Chapter 9, Problem 2
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 4
Due May 14, Wednesday
1. Chapter 7, Problem 3 First note that this game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. If the state police sets a speed trap then the best reply of the driver
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 5
Due May 21, Wednesday
1. Chapter 9, Problem 5 a) Consider the final subgame associated with the letter having been sent. The strategic form is in Figure SOL9.5.1. Defect is a dominant str
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 5
Due May 21, Wednesday
1. Chapter 9, Problem 5 2. Chapter 9, Problem 6 3. Chapter 9, Problem 10 4. Chapter 10, Problem 1 5. Chapter 10, Problem 3
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 3
Due April 23, Wednesday
1. Chapter 5, Problem 5 2. Chapter 5, Problem 10 3. Chapter 6, Problem 2 4. Chapter 6, Problem 3 5. Chapter 6, Problem 4 6. Chapter 6, Problem 8
Chapter 11: Signaling Games
Dynamic games with incomplete information. Dynamic games with incomplete information. Signaling games Signaling games - A player with private information (sender) moves A player with private information (sender) moves fi
Games with Private Information
So far we have assumed that the game is common So far we have assumed that the game is common knowledge to all players: each player knows knowledge to all players: each player knows - Who are playing Who are playing -
SG with Imperfect Information
The Kidnapping game with simultaneous ransom and release decisions.
Guy Do not kidnap I Kidnap II Vivica Guy 3 Vivica 5 Pay ransom Do not pay ransom IV III Kill Guy Release Kill Release
Imperfect information: some infor
Chapter 8: Sequential Games
Kidnapping game
Do not kidnap Guy Kidnap
Vivica Guy 3 Vivica 5 Pay ransom Do not pay ransom Guy Release
Guy
Perfect information: all the information sets are singleton.
Kill
Release Kill
4 1
5 3
2 2
1 4
Strategy
Prof. Huanxing Yang Office Hours: Thursdays 1:30pm-3:30pm, 405 Arps Hall
e-mail: yang.1041@osu.edu Phone: 614-292-6523
Economics 601: Game Theory
Spring 2008 The objective of this course is to introduce you to game-theoretic reasoning and show its
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 1
Due April 16, Wednesday
1. Chapter 4, Problem 5 a) Since b is optimal when player 2 uses x, c is optimal when player 2 uses y, and d is optimal when player 2 uses z, player 1's strategies
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 3
Due April 23, Wednesday
1. Chapter 5, Problem 5 a) The payoff matrix is shown in Figure SOL5.5.1. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which both order salmon. In fact, salmon is the dom
Chapter 1: Introduction
From womb to tomb, life is a series of social encounters.
Jun. 1, 2007 -Oh, IIget it. IIcry and then they feed me. II Jun. 1, 2007 Oh, get it. cry and then they feed me. wonder what else IIcan get them to do. Lets see what h
Chapter 2:Building a Game
Reality is very complex
What to put in a model (what to pack for college)
A literal model:accurate description of the realA literal model accurate description of the realworld setting. world setting. A metaphorical model:
Chapter 3:Eliminating the Impossible
"How often have I Isaid to you that when you have eliminated "How often have said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must the impossible, whatever remains,
Chapter 4: Nash Equilibrium
Chicken Game Chicken Game - Two cars facing each other in duel-like fashion. Two cars facing each other in duel-like fashion. - Cars come hurtling towards one another: each driver Cars come hurtling towards one another: e
Chapter 5: n-Player Games
Players have the same strategy sets. Players have the same strategy sets. First cover symmetric games (identical payoff functions), First cover symmetric games (identical payoff functions), then cover asymmetric games. the
Chapter 6: Continuous Games
Players' strategy sets are an interval of real numbers: Players' strategy sets are an interval of real numbers: continuous strategy set. continuous strategy set. First we cover Bertrand (price) competition and elected Fi
Mixed Strategies
In baseball, what type of pitch does the pitcher throw: fastball, splitter, curveball, slider? What type of pitch does the batter prepare for. In penalty kicks of soccer, where should the kick direct the ball: left, middle, or righ
Dr. Huanxing Yang
Econ 601 Game Theory
Homework Assignment 6
Due May 28, Wednesday
1. Chapter 10, Problem 5 In answering part (b), we will also provide the answer to part (a). A strategy for player 1 is a pair of actions; an action when his type is