The (Braess) Transportation Paradox - Route 1 Bridge A A - slow road: 15 minutes - Bridge B Route 2 slow road: 15 minutes - B
1000 cars must commute from point A to point B. East-West roads ta
Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative games are often defined in terms of a characteristic function, which specifies the outcomes that each coalition can achieve for itself. For some games, outcomes ar
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
For an important class of extensive games, a solution concept is available that is simpler than sequential equilibrium, but with similar properties.
In a Bayesian extens
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
In strategic games, players must form beliefs about the other players' strategies, based on the presumed equilibrium being played.
In Bayesian games, playe
Repeated Games
A repeated game (say, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma) is a special case of an extensive game.
The additional structure of the same game being repeated allows for new results.
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
There is perfect information if each player making a move observes all events that have previously occurred. Start by restricting attention to games without s
Knowledge and Common Knowledge
Game Theory requires us to be interested in knowledge of "parameters" like costs, valuations, and demand, but also knowledge about what other players know.
Consider a
Pearce, "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica 1984 Rationalizability is a weaker (broader) solution concept than Nash equilibrium. It looks at the implication
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Let G = hN, (Ai), (ui)i be a strategic game. Preferences must be specified over lotteries on A, which we assume are represented by the expectation of ui(a). Let (Ai) b
Bayesian Games
How do we model uncertainty about the payoffs or (more generally) knowledge of the other players? The traditional distinction (see Fudenberg and Tirole) is that uncertainty about payof
Games in Strategic Form
Definition 11.1: A strategic game consists of: 1. a finite set N (the set of players), 2. for each player i N, a nonempty set Ai (the set of actions available to player i), 3
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Economics 817: Game Theory
Syllabus and Reading List
James Peck and David Schmeidler Autumn 2007 www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jpeck/Econ817.htm M-W 11:30 -
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Game Theory Fall 2007 Prof. James Peck Homework #2-Due Wednesday October 17 Directions: Answer all questions, and be neat. If you discuss the
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Advanced Game Theory Fall 2007 Prof. James Peck Homework #2 Answers 1. O-R, exercise 56.4. Answer: By the symmetry of the game, the set of ra
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Game Theory Homework #1-Due Monday October 8 Directions: Answer all questions, and be neat. If you discuss the questions in study groups, lis
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Game Theory Fall 2007 Prof. James Peck Homework #1 Answers 1. O-R, exercise 19.1. Answer: There are n players, and each player i has the acti
Myerson and Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," JET 1983 In many bilateral bargaining situations with asymmetric information, ex post efficiency is inconsistent with incentive