In-Class Quiz 3
Econ 208
This Quiz will NOT be graded.
Your Name:
Remember the model from the lecture note.
Two period
The demand for aluminium in each period
D1 (p) = 100 p
and
D2 (p) = 120 p
Production and recycling are free (units of the good used i
Homework 1 : Solution
Econ 208
Submit your answer at the beginning of Lecture 3.
1. Suppose that a firm incurs the total cost C(q) when it produces q > 0, and that marginal
cost (M C) and average cost (AC) are defined as follows:
M C = C (q) =
AC =
dC(q)
Final Exam, Econ 208
Industrial Organization
Term 1, 2014
Instructions
You have 120 minutes to answer the following questions.
Dont forget to write your name.
No electronics.
You must show your work to receive credit for your answers. Show the steps y
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 8
Due Date: Thursday, November 15th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please w
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 2
Due Date: Thursday, September 13th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 5
Due Date: Thursday, October 4th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please wri
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 3
Due Date: Thursday, September 20th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 7
Due Date: Thursday, November 8th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please wr
School of Economics
Academic Year 2014-15
Term 2
Econ 217 Macroeconomics of Income Distribution
Instructor Name
: Ho Kong Weng
Email
: [email protected]
Tel
: 6808-7955
Office
: SOE 5034
COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course will introduce methods of measuring inc
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 1
Due Date: Thursday, September 6th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the
main office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please w
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 4
Due Date: Thursday, September 27th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due date. (Please
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 2 (answer key)
Due Date: Thursday, September 13th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due d
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 4 (answer key)
Due Date: Thursday, September 27th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due d
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 3 (answer key)
Due Date: Thursday, September 20th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due d
Name_SID_Section_
Homework assignment 7 (answer key)
Due Date: Thursday, November 8th, 5pm
Please submit your assignment into the box under the instructors name, Yi Zhang, outside the main
office at the 5th floor of School of Economics, before the due dat
Midterm, Econ 208
Industrial Organization
Term 1, 2014
NAME:
Instructions
0 You have 90 minutes to answer the following questions.
0 Dont forget to write your name.
0 No electronics.
0 Please answer in the space provided underneath each question. If you
Final Exam, Econ 208
Industrial Organization
Term 1, 2014
Instructions
You have 120 minutes to answer the following questions.
Dont forget to write your name.
No electronics.
You must show your work to receive credit for your answers. Show the steps y
Homework 2
Econ 208
Submit your answer at the beginning of Lecture 3.
1. Suppose the following table summarizes the willingness-to-pay for dierent dishes by the three
types of consumers. Assume all consumers come in equal proportion BUT the restaurant
can
Econ 206: Problem Set
This problem set contains problems from the textbook An Introduction to Game
Theory by Martin J. Osborne.
Solutions to some of these problems are available at the following website.
http:/www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/igt/
The pr
ECON 418, SPRING 2012
PROBLEM SET 2
DUE FEB 21 (TUES), IN CLASS
Problem 1. Two people are engaged in a joint project. If each person i puts in the effort
xi , a nonnegative number equal to at most 1, which costs her c(xi ), the outcome of the
project is w
ECON 418, SPRING 2012
PROBLEM SET 3
DUE MAR 2 (FRI) BY 5 PM
You may hand this in to your TA or to me or slide it under my door, if I am not in.
Problem 1. A group of n firms uses a common resource (a river or a forest, for example)
to produce output. As t
1
Solutions to Homework 1
1.1
16.1 (Working on a joint project)
Suppose the two actions are W for Work hard, G for Goof off. Any matrix where ui (W, W ) >
ui (G, W ) > ui (G, G) > ui (W, G) for both players i = 1, 2 will satisfy the conditions. For
exampl
Singapore Management University
Stat 151: Introduction to Statistical Theory
Review for the nal
Spring, 2013
General information
1. The format of the nal is similar to that of the midterm and practice nal.
2. Similar to the mid term exam, the nal exam wil
Econ 206: Syllabus for Final Exam.
The nal exam will cover the following sections of An Introduction to Game
Theory (by Osborne).
5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
5.1. Extensive Games with Perfect Information
5.2. Strategies and Outcome
Econ 418
Spring 2012
Solutions: Problem Set 1
Problem 1
a. The game is described as the following:
Table 1
A
M
A 3, 3 3, 2
M 2, 3 2, 2
The Nash equilibrium is (A, A).
b. When they share the bill, ordering the appetizer gives utility (3,3) to both of them.
Econ 418
Spring 2012
Solutions: Problem Set 2
Problem 1
A strategic game that models this situation is:
Players The two people.
Actions The set of actions of each person i is the set of effort levels (the set of numbers
xi with 0 xi 1).
Preferences Person
Econ 418
Spring 2012
Solutions: Problem Set 3
Problem 1
The game is given as follows:
Players The firms.
Actions Each firms set of actions is the set of all nonnegative numbers (representing
the amount of input it uses).
Preferences The payoff of each fir
Cournot, Stackelberg, and collusion
Massimiliano Landi
Singapore Management University
March 13, 2011
Abstract
These notes report the content of the lectures on Cournot and
Stackelberg duopoly games. Some parts elaborate on questions from
the floor. I hop