From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/
Chapter 8
Modeli

Networks HW #4
Tingting Gu
Oct 19, 2016
(1)
(a) It is not possible that B and C have no other neighbors. If that is the case,
according to Nash equilibrium bargaining outcome, A is the most power node

Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 7
Due at 11:15am, November 13, 2015
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. The le you upload must be

Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 6
Due at 11:15am, November 6, 2015
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. The le you upload must be

From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/
Chapter 17
Netwo

From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/
Chapter 16
Infor

Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm
The midterm is Monday, October 5, in class. It will be a closed-book, closed-notes exam.
The best guide to the coverage of the midterm is the contents of the course lectures up through th

Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm Solution
(1.a) Yes, it is okay to participate, and bid the true value. In a second price auction,
bidding the true value is optimal no matter what others are doing as bidding truthfully i

Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm
The midterm is Monday, October 5, in class. It will be a closed-book, closed-notes exam.
The best guide to the coverage of the midterm is the contents of the course lectures up through th

Networks: Fall 2016
David Easley and Eva
Tardos
Practice Midterm Solution
(1a) (4 points) Bidder 2 will win and will pay 5. The explanations is: Their dominant
strategies are to bid their values and in a a second price auction the highest bidder wins and

(1)
(a) As bidder 1, I would bid my actual value regardless of what values bidders 2 and 3
are thinking. Explanation: Because this is a second price seed bid auction, if I bid value less
than my actual value, there is a chance that bidder 2 or 3 bids on a

1.
(a) When at equilibrium, x=z
r(x)f(z)=r(x)f(x)=(1-x^1/2)(4x^1/2)
solving quadratic function:
x1=9/16 x2=1/16 there is one other equilibrium at x=0
(b) Only at x=9/16 and x=0 is stable.
a. x>9/16, there are fewer consumers buying than what is expected,

(1) Strong Triadic Closure Property: a node violates strong triadic closure property if it has two
strong ties to nodes, b and c, but there is no edge between b and c.
- node E satisfies it because it always form triangle with two other nodes that it has

1.
(a) A: patients who have the diseases B: test positive
P(A)=1/10000=0.01%
P(BIA)=1
P(BInot A)=1%
P(AIB)=(P(A)P(BIA)/P(B)
P(B) comes from two parts : P(BIA)P(A)+P(BInot A)P(not A)=1*0.0001+0.01*0.9999=0.010099
P(AIB)=(0.0001*1)/0.010099=1%
(b) C: family

Networks: Fall 2016
David Easley and Eva
Tardos
Practice Midterm
The midterm is Wednesday, October 5, in class. It will be a closed-book, closed-notes
exam. The best guide to the coverage of the midterm is the contents of the course lectures up
through th

Networks Pset 5
Tingting Gu
(1)
(a)
one set of market clearing prices are Pa=11 Pb=5 Pc=0
The perfect matching: Z: slot A; X: slot B; Y: slot C
(b)
According to the VCG Procedure, we allocat

1.
2.
3.
(a) When at equilibrium, x=z
r(x)f(z)=r(x)f(x)=(1-x^1/2)(4x^1/2)
solving quadratic function:
x1=9/16 x2=1/16 there is one other equilibrium at x=0
(b) Only at x=9/16 and