Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, May 20th
Final Exam
Exercise 1 (18 points)
Consider the following Trust Game: The Investor (I) has $20 and the possibility to either keep it all
(and the game ends) or to invest it all in the Trustee (T). If he invests al
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Please hand in your answers by Friday, September 24th, before class.
Problem Set 2
Exercise 1
Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the foll
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Problem Set 4
Exercise 1
a) One player in the study by ONeill (1987) chose 19 times to play the Joker in 105 games. The
mixed strategy Nash Equili
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Please hand in your answers by Wednesday, November 3rd, before class.
Problem Set 4
Exercise 1
a) One player in the study by ONeill (1987) chose 1
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Please hand in your answers by email by Wednesday, November 17th, noon.
Problem Set 5
There have been many studies on social preferences. Some of
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Problem Set 6 Solutions
Exercise 1
Indicate the choice predictions by the theory of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) for the
following
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, April 7th 2010
Preliminary Exam 2
Exercise 1 (10 points)
a) Dene Primary, Secondary, and Schelling salience.
b) Comment on the following results of the classroom experiment with respect to the predictions of
the three typ
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, April 7th 2010
Preliminary Exam 2
Name:
Exercise 1 (10 points)
a) Dene Primary, Secondary, and Schelling salience.
b) Comment on the following results of the classroom experiment with respect to the predictions of
the thr
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590 Experiments and Games
This course consists of 14 weeks of lectures. Requirements are 6 homeworks (25%), 2 preliminary
exams (20% each) and one nal exam (35%).
Oce hours
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Please hand in your answers by Friday, October 22nd, before class.
Problem Set 3
Exercise 1
Pages 338-340 in the textbook by Camerer give coordina
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Problem Set 3
Exercise 2
Each of the following boxes, identied uniquely by a number, can be chosen in a coordination
game.
i) A = cfw_2, 5, 11, 17
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Problem Set 2 Solutions
Exercise 1
1 SPNE:
AS
B C after S, C after C (denoted (CC) in the following)
Player A
SS
0,0
1,1
S
C
Player B
CC SC
2,1 0,
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, October 1st 2010
Preliminary Exam 1
Exercise 1 (10 points)
a) Dene causal eect. The causal eect of X1 on Y is the eect of varying X1 holding
xed X = (X2 , . . . , XN )
b) What does it mean for a study to be internally val
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, November 12th, 2010
Preliminary Exam 2
Exercise 1 (12 points)
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium play has been studied by Palacios-Huerta (2003) in
the context of soccer penalty shots. The following game can be one represent
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, November 12th, 2010
Preliminary Exam 2
Exercise 1 (12 points)
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium play has been studied by Palacios-Huerta (2003) in the context of
soccer penalty shots. The following game can be one represent
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, May 20th, 2010
Final Exam
In total, 120 points can be obtained. You should be able to nish within 2 hours. The points per
question can be an indication about your time allocation in minutes.
Exercise 1 (18 points)
Conside
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, March 1st 2010
Preliminary Exam 1
Exercise 1
Tp
B1p
Player A
Player B
Lq R1q
7,3
3,2
5,2
4,7
a) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure and mixed strategies of this game.
2 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria: (T, L) and (B, R). 1 Mix
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, March 1st 2010
Preliminary Exam 1
Exercise 1 (13 points)
Player A
T
B
Player B
L
R
7,3 3,2
5,2 4,7
a) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure and mixed strategies of this game.
b) Under a level of reasoning model with uniform le
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Problem Set 1
Exercise 1
1. What does it mean for a study to be externally valid ? An externally valid study presents
results that can be taken fr
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, [email protected]
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games
Please hand in your answers by Friday, September 10, before class.
Problem Set 1
Exercise 1
1. What does it mean for results of a study to be exte
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, October 1st 2010
Preliminary Exam 1
Exercise 1 (10 points)
a) Dene causal eect.
b) What does it mean for a study to be internally valid?
c) Use the all-causes model to show how selection is threatening internal validity.