Chapter 9 Textbook Problems
Chapter 9: Bayesian Games
282.1 (Fighting an Opponent of Unknown Strength) *Very Likely!*
Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not known whether person 2 is
Chapter 10 Textbook Problems
Chapter 10: Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
319.3 (Nash Equilibria of Card Game)
Each of two players begins by putting a dollar in the pot. Player 1 is then dea
Econ 4020
Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium II
1. Consider the two-person strategic form game in which N = cfw_1, 2, A1 = A2 = R, and
the utility functions are:
u1 (a1 , a2 ) = a1 a2 a2
1
2
u2 (a1 , a2 ) =
Rationalizability
Bruno Salcedo
Reading assignments: Watson, Ch. 7 & 8
Cornell University ECON4020 Game Theory Spring 2017
1 / 18
knowledge hierarchies
Mutual knowledge everyone knows
2nd order mutu
Econ 4020 Second Preliminary Exam Practice
There are 6 problems. You have 70 minutes. Justify all your answers. Good luck!
1. What is your name?
2. What percentage grade from 0 to 100 do you think you
The war of attrition
Game: 2 animals ght over an indivisible prey (two rms compete for the right to stay in the market
which is too small for two). The prey is worth vi to each i cfw_1, 2. Each animal
Cournot model with xed costs
Game: 2 rms, compete by choosing quantities they produce/sell. The product is homogeneous, and
the choices are made simultaneously. The demand for the product is given by
2. If a player has a dominant strategy in a simultaneous-move game, then she is sure to get her
best outcome. True or false? Explain and give an example of a game that illustrates your
answer.
4. Supp
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Homework 7
Due date and time: December 6, 2013 - in class
1. Consider the following version of the entry game:
Challenger
Out
Ready
U nready
Incumbent
2, 4
A
F
3, 2
1, 1
A
F
4,
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Homework 6
Due date and time: November 27, 2013 - in class
1. There are two individuals, each can be either type A or B. There is a task that has to be completed,
only one apt
Rationality and Dominance
Bruno Salcedo
Reading assignments: Watson, Ch. 46
Cornell University ECON4020 Game Theory Spring 2017
1 / 27
uggs vs. rain boots
2 / 27
uggs vs. rain boots
Emma would like t
Strategic Form Games
Bruno Salcedo
Reading assignments: Watson, Ch. 3 & 4
Cornell University ECON4020 Game Theory Spring 2017
1 / 25
strategies
A strategy is a complete contingent plant for a player i
524581
research-article2014
PSSXXX10.1177/0956797614524581Mueller, OppenheimerLonghand and Laptop Note Taking
Psychological Science OnlineFirst, published on April 23, 2014 as doi:10.1177/095679761452
Econ 4020
Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium & Subgame Perfection
1. In the game below, player 1 chooses rows, 2 chooses columns and three chooses matrices.
Only player 3s payos are indicated. Show that act
Spring 2015
Econ 4020
Problem Set 0
The purpose of this problem set is to provide you with examples of the kinds
of probability calculations we will be doing in the second half of the course.
The prob
Econ 4020
Game Theory
Nash Equilibrium I
1. Two players are playing the following card game. Each player has a deck of cards. The
rst player puts down a card. Seeing this, the second player puts down
Hembrooke and Gay
Journal of Computing in Higher Education
Fall 2003, Vol. 15(1), ?-?.
The Laptop and the Lecture:
The Effects of Multitasking in
Learning Environments
Helene Hembrooke and Geri Gay
Hu
Spring 2015
Econ 4020
Problem Set 0
The purpose of this problem set is to provide you with examples of the kinds
of probability calculations we will be doing in the second half of the course.
The prob
Rationality and Dominance
Bruno Salcedo
Reading assignments: Watson, Ch. 4 & 5, and App. B
Cornell University ECON4020 Game Theory Spring 2017
1 / 41
uggs vs. rain boots
2 / 41
uggs vs. rain boots
Em
Extensive Form Games
Bruno Salcedo
Reading assignments: Watson, Ch. 2 & 14
Cornell University ECON4020 Game Theory Spring 2017
1 / 28
extensive form games
Strategic environment
Agents make choices
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Homework 4
Due date and time: November 1, 2013 - in class
1. Two rms, rm 1 and rm 2, must decide whether to enter a new industry. Industry demand is
P = 900 Q. To enter the ind
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Homework 5
Due date and time: this HW is optional, it will not be graded; solutions will be posted on
November 6
1. Consider the following game with two states, A and B. Each s
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Homework 2
Due date and time: October 2, 2013 - in class
1. Consider a two-player, two-strategy game where the payos are independent random draws from a
uniform distribution on
ECON 4020 Game Theory
Prelim Exam II (Make-Up)
Note: The exam is closed book, closed notes. No programmable calculators are
allowed, and phones or internet devices cannot be used during the exam.
Plea
Name (print): _
ID: _
ECON 4020 Game Theory
Prelim Exam I
Note: The exam is closed book, closed notes. No programmable calculators are
allowed, and phones or internet devices cannot be used during the
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Solutions: Homework 7
Due date and time: December 6, 2013 - in class
1. Consider the following version of the entry game:
Challenger
Out
Ready
U nready
Incumbent
2, 4
A
F
3, 2
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Solutions: Homework 4
Due date and time: November 1, 2013 - in class
1. Two rms, rm 1 and rm 2, must decide whether to enter a new industry. Industry demand is
P = 900 Q. To en
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Solutions: Homework 6
Due date and time: November 27, 2013 - in class
1. There are two individuals, each can be either type A or B. There is a task that has to be completed,
on
ECON 4020 - Game Theory
Homework 5
Due date and time: this HW is optional, it will not be graded; solutions will be posted on
November 6
1. Consider the following game with two states, A and B. Each s