Networks: Fall 2014
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 2 Solutions
(1a) The only pure Nash equilibrium here is (U, R). For any other strategy pair, there is a
player that benets from deviating.
(
Networks: Fall 2014
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Solutions
(1) We know that in a second price auction bidding your true value is a dominant strategy that is, no matter
what the others do
Alexander Downey (ajd242)
Econ 2040 - Homework 1
9/9/2016
Question 1:
The following list corresponds to their respective node, followed by if that node satisfies
or violates the Strong Triadic Clo
Networks: Fall 2016
David Easley and Eva
Tardos
Homework 1 Solutions
(1) (max of 6 points)
A, B, E, G and H satisfy the property while C, D and F violate it.
A satisfies the property. It only has one
Blog Post Number 2
Slap in the Facebook: It's Time for Social Networks to Open Up
http:/www.wired.com/software/webservices/news/2007/08/open_social_net Basically in this article, the author talks abo
1) a. First, for T1 the only possible values are that T1 offers 0 to S1 and sells to B1 for 1
because T1 has a monopoly over B1 and S1, and thus has complete control over them.
T2 also has a monopoly
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Solution Set 5
(1) (a) In the book, we saw that if the rst two students guess blue, and the third student then
draws a red marble, then the condition
Networks: Fall 2016
David Easley and Eva
Tardos
Homework 2 Solutions
(1.a) (max of 1 point) Recall that a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies that are best
responses to each other. Thus, in a two
Networks: Fall 2012
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Practice Final Exam: solutions
December 1, 2013
Details of the nal exam are listed on handout with the questions. Here you get solutions,
and list of ot
Usaamah Khan
UK45
1. Bidder 1 should bid his true value regardless of what the others bid. Truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy and it makes sense to bid your true value even if other bidders are
o
1. (a) T1: It holds a monopoly over S1 and B1 since T1 is the only node connected to these two.
The flow of trade will from S1 to B1, and the profit T1 will get is 1-0=1. Bid price for S1 is 0,
ask pr
Homework 6 Solutions
(1a) Let P r(BB ) be the probability that two blue balls are drawn. Then using Bayes Rule
we know that
P r(m B |BB ) =
P r(BB |mB )P r(mB )
P r(BB )
Since the probability of drawi
Networks: Fall 2011 David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 2 Due in Class September 16, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/c
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm
The midterm is Wednesday, October 6, in class. It will be a closed-book, closed-notes
exam. The best guide to the coverage of the mi
Ji Soo Kim
Assignment 3
Econ 2040
September 28, 2013
1.
!
I should bid to my own value because if I bid more than my value (alternate bid),
and won, I could pay more than my value because bidder 2 and
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 5
Due November 12, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to
the CMS site, at https:/cms.csug
Networks: Spring 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm February 26, 2010
The midterm is Monday, March 8, in class. It will be a closed-notes exam. The best guide to the coverage of the
Homework 3 Solutions
(1) We know that in a second-price, sealed-bid auction that bidding your true value is a
dominant strategy. That is, no matter what the others do, you are better bidding
truthfull
Networks: Fall 2013
Homework 3
David Easley and Eva Tardos Due at 11:15am, Monday, September 30, 2013
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to
courses Blackb
Networks: Fall 2013
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 4
Due at 11:15am, Friday, October 25, 2013
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to courses
Blackboa
Networks: Fall 2014
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 5 Solutions
(1a) By multiplying the click-through rate and advertisers valuations for each click, we obtain
advertisers valuations for slots
From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.co
Networks: Fall 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 2 Due in Class September 17, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https
Networks: Fall 2011
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework
Due before class on October 28, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https
Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley & Jon Kleinberg
Homework 2
Due 11:15am, Friday, September 18, 2015
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at
Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Solutions
(1) We know that in a second price auction bidding your true value is a dominant strategy that is, no matter
what the others do
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 5
Due November 11, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to
the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab
Networks: Spring 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Due February 26, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/cms.cs
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 5
Due November 11, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to
the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab