Networks: Fall 2014
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Solutions
(1) We know that in a second price auction bidding your true value is a dominant strategy that is, no matter
what the others do you are better o bidding truthfully. So the fact that b
Networks: Fall 2012
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Practice Final Exam: solutions
December 1, 2013
Details of the nal exam are listed on handout with the questions. Here you get solutions,
and list of other topics to think about.
(1)
(a) Yes, U is dominant s
Homework 6 Solutions
(1a) Let P r(BB ) be the probability that two blue balls are drawn. Then using Bayes Rule
we know that
P r(m B |BB ) =
P r(BB |mB )P r(mB )
P r(BB )
Since the probability of drawing one blue ball when the majority of the balls are blu
Networks: Spring 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm February 26, 2010
The midterm is Monday, March 8, in class. It will be a closed-notes exam. The best guide to the coverage of the midterm is the contents of the course lectures up throu
Usaamah Khan
UK45
1. Bidder 1 should bid his true value regardless of what the others bid. Truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy and it makes sense to bid your true value even if other bidders are
overbidding, underbidding or behaving in unpredictable w
1. (a) T1: It holds a monopoly over S1 and B1 since T1 is the only node connected to these two.
The flow of trade will from S1 to B1, and the profit T1 will get is 1-0=1. Bid price for S1 is 0,
ask price for B1 is 1.
T2: It holds a monopoly over S2, S3, a
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Solution Set 5
(1) (a) In the book, we saw that if the rst two students guess blue, and the third student then
draws a red marble, then the conditional probability that the urn is majority-blue is 2/3, an
Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Solutions
(1) We know that in a second price auction bidding your true value is a dominant strategy that is, no matter
what the others do you are better o bidding truthfully. So the fact that b
1) a. First, for T1 the only possible values are that T1 offers 0 to S1 and sells to B1 for 1
because T1 has a monopoly over B1 and S1, and thus has complete control over them.
T2 also has a monopoly over S2, S3, and B2 since each are also only connected
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Midterm
The midterm is Wednesday, October 6, in class. It will be a closed-book, closed-notes
exam. The best guide to the coverage of the midterm is the contents of the course lectures up
through
Networks: Fall 2015
David Easley & Jon Kleinberg
Homework 2
Due 11:15am, Friday, September 18, 2015
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. The le you upload mus
Networks: Fall 2011
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework
Due before class on October 28, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you should
Networks: Fall 2013
Homework 3
David Easley and Eva Tardos Due at 11:15am, Monday, September 30, 2013
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to
courses Blackboard site. The le you upload must be in PDF format. It
From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/
Chapter 3
Strong
Blog Post Number 2
Slap in the Facebook: It's Time for Social Networks to Open Up
http:/www.wired.com/software/webservices/news/2007/08/open_social_net Basically in this article, the author talks about how there are social networks all over the Inte
Networks: Fall 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 2 Due in Class September 17, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you should
Networks: Fall 2013
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 4
Due at 11:15am, Friday, October 25, 2013
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to courses
Blackboard site. The le you upload must be in PDF format. It is
From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/
Chapter 5
Positi
Networks: Spring 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Due February 26, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you should write th
Networks: Fall 2011 David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 3 Due before class on September 26, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you sho
Networks: Fall 2011 David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 2 Due in Class September 16, 2011
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you should wri
Networks: Fall 2011
David Easley and Eva Tardos
Homework 6
Due before class Wednesday, November 23
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to
the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you sh
Networks: Fall 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework
Due in Class October 29, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you should writ
From the book Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
By David Easley and Jon Kleinberg. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Complete preprint on-line at http:/www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/
Chapter 2
Graphs
Networks: Fall 2010 David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 3 Due in Class September 29, 2010
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. This means that you should
Networks: Spring 2010
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Practice Final Exam
November 29, 2010
The nal exam is Friday, December 10, 2:00 - 4:30 PM in Barton Hall (Central
section). It will be a closed-book, closed-notes exam. The nal will be cumulative, in th
Ji Soo Kim
Econ 2040
PS8
November 26, 2013
1.
a. Since the buyers are not aware of the quality of the used cars, they are willing to pay
up to 13,000(1/2)+8000(1/2)= 10,500 for a good car. Sellers minimum value for a
good car is 10,000. Thus the equilibri
Econ 2040
Ji Soo Kim
Problem set 4
October 24, 2013
1. a. Both traders have monopoly over their buyers and sellers. Therefore, they can pay
only sellers ask and buyers bid. Thus, each trader pay 0 to seller and earn 1 from
buyer. NE=(0,1) The good will be
Networks: Fall 2014
David Easley and Jon Kleinberg
Homework 4
Due at 11:15am, October 24, 2014
As noted on the course home page, homework solutions must be submitted by upload to the
CMS site, at https:/cms.csuglab.cornell.edu/. The le you upload must be
Alexander Downey (ajd242)
Econ 2040 - Homework 1
9/9/2016
Question 1:
The following list corresponds to their respective node, followed by if that node satisfies
or violates the Strong Triadic Closure Principle and brief explanation why.
A. Node A
Problem 1
Part A
Bidder 1 should bid the value v1.
This is a second-price auction, which has a dominant strategy for all bidders
to bid their value for the good. In a second-price auction you pay the second
highest bid even though your bid may have been h
Problem 1
Part A
Bidder 1 should bid the value v1.
This is a second-price auction, which has a dominant strategy for all bidders
to bid their value for the good. In a second-price auction you pay the second
highest bid even though your bid may have been h
Alexander Downey (ajd242)
9/15/2016
ECON 2040 Problem Set 2
Question 1:
Part A:
If B -> L, then A -> U
If A -> U, then B -> R
If B -> R, then A -> U
If A -> D, then B -> R
There exists a dominate strategy for both players A should always choose U
and B sh
Problem 1
Part A
Bidder 1 should bid the value v1.
This is a second-price auction, which has a dominant strategy for all bidders
to bid their value for the good. In a second-price auction you pay the second
highest bid even though your bid may ha