Majority Judgment
Matt Van Essen
University of Alabama
Van Essen (U of A)
MJ
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New Environment
In this set of notes we outline a new method of social choice called
"Majority Judgment" due to Balinski and Laraki.
The new social choice environment agai
EC497/597: Games and Decisions
Problem Set 2
1
Book Problems:
Solve the following problems from Watson everywhere replacing rationalizable
by survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Chapter 6: questions 1, 6, 7
Chapter 7: questions
Important Topics for First Midterm
Exam:
1) Computational: take a social choice procedure- outcome
2) Essay-ish: question talk about it (what is nice part of this voting
procedure, what is downfall)
3) Proofs: given a s.c.p show it satisfies some property
Arrows Impossibility Theorem1
Matt Van Essen
University of Alabama
1 The
proof presented is based on Reny (2000).
Van Essen (U of A)
Impossibility Theorem
1 / 44
Arrows Impossibility Theorem
Theorem
If the number of possible alternatives is greater than o
Social Ranking Functions
Matt Van Essen
University of Alabama
Van Essen (U of A)
SRF
1 / 21
Social Ranking Functions
Previously we have been interested in choosing a winner (or winners)
from a collection of individual preference lists.
In this lecture we
Social Choice: Manipulation and Analysis (Econ 497/ Econ 597)
Problem Set 7: Majority Judgment
1. Suppose we have 4 alternatives a, b, c, and d which are evaluated by 4
voters using the grades
= fA; B; C; D; F g. Further suppose that the
grades assigned b
Summary of Results
Matt Van Essen
University of Alabama
Van Essen (U of A)
Re-Cap
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Summary of Traditional Social Choice Model
In this lecture we provide a summary of the course so far.
Specically, we review the assumptions of the traditional social
Social Choice: Manipulation and Analysis (Econ 497/ Econ 597)
Problem Set 7: Majority Judgment
1. Suppose we have 4 alternatives a, b, c, and d which are evaluated by 4
voters using the grades
= fA; B; C; D; F g. Further suppose that the
grades assigned b
Social Choice: Manipulation and Analysis (Econ 497/ Econ 597)
Problem Set 8: Power in voting
1. Suppose there are 5 men and 7 women.
(a) How many dierent ways can we arrange these 12 people in a line?
(b) How many dierent committees of 4 people can be for
Social Choice: Manipulation and Analysis (Econ 497/ Econ 597)
Problem Set 8: Power in voting
1. Suppose there are 5 men and 7 women.
(a) How many dierent ways can we arrange these 12 people in a line?
12!
(b) How many dierent committees of 4 people can be
Social Choice: Manipulation and Analysis (Econ 497/ Econ 597)
Problem Set 6: Arrows Impossibility Theorem
Theorem 1 If the number of possible alternatives is greater than or equal to
three, then there is no social ranking function F that satises the Paret
Approval Voting
Matt Van Essen
University of Alabama
Van Essen (U of A)
AV
1/8
Approval Voting
The voting systems we have looked at so far are social choice
procedures: a collection of individual preference lists (without ties) is
the input, and the outpu
Important Topics for First Midterm
Important Denitions
1. What does it mean for a voting procedure with two alternatives to be anonoumous?
2. What does it mean for a voting procedure with two alternatives to be neutral?
3. What does it mean for a voting p
Social Choice: Manipulation and Analysis (Econ 497/ Econ 597)
Problem Set 3: Political Power
Counting Problems
1. MAP Chapter 3, Problem 3
2. MAP Chapter 3, Problem 4
3. MAP Chapter 3, Problem 5
4. MAP Chapter 3, Problem 6
5. MAP Chapter 3, Problem 7
6. M
Approval Voting
Matt Van Essen
University of Alabama
Van Essen (U of A)
AV
1/8
Approval Voting
The voting systems we have looked at so far are social choice
procedures: a collection of individual preference lists (without ties) is
the input, and the outpu