14.126 Lecture Notes on Supermodular Games
Muhamet Yildiz
April 22, 2010
A common exercise in economics is to understand how a particular outcome varies
qualitatively varies with a particular parameter, e.g., whether income tax increases the
investment le
14.126 Game theory
Problem Set 5
The due date for this assignment is Monday May 7.
1. Consider a two-player Bayesian game in which the payos are as in the following table
a
b
a
,
1, 0
b 0, 1
0, 0
Each player i observes a signal xi = + i where (0, 1) and
14.126 Game theory
Problem Set 4
The due date for this assignment is Friday April 23. Please quote your sources.
1. For any set S , let X be the set of all open subsets of S . Show that (X, ) is a complete
lattice. What are the join and meet operators?
2.
14.126 Game theory
Problem Set 3
The due date for this assignment is Thursday April 15.
sources.
Please quote your
1. Consider a repeated linear Cournot duopoly with one long-run player who maximizes
the discounted sum of stage prots (with discount factor
14.126 GAME THEORY
PROBLEM SET 2
MIHAI MANEA
Due by Wednesday, March 31, 5:00 PM
Question 1
Find all (a) Nash, (b) trembling-hand perfect, (c) proper equilibria (in pure or mixed
strategies) of the following normal-form game.
L
R
U
2,2 2,2
M
3,3 1,0
D
0,0
14.126 GAME THEORY
PROBLEM SET 1
MIHAI MANEA
Due by Wednesday, February 24, 5pm
Question 1
Consider the following game. Each of 15 students simultaneously announces a number in
the set cfw_1, 2, . . . , 100. A prize of $1 is split equally between all stud
14.126 Game Theory
Final Exam
You have 24 hours from the time you pick up the exam (i.e. you need to return
your solutions by the same time next day). You can use any existing written
source, but you cannot discuss the content of this exam with others. Qu
14.126 Game Theory
Final Exam
You have 24 hours from the time you pick up the exam (i.e. you need to return
your solutions by the same time next day). You can use any existing written
source, but you cannot discuss the content of this exam with others. Qu
14.126 (Game Theory) Final Examination
Instructions: This is an open-book exam you may consult written material
but you may not consult other humans. There are four questions, weighted equally.
You have 24 hours to complete the exam from the time you rst
14.126 (Game Theory) Final Examination
Instructions: This is an open-book exam you may consult written material
but you may not consult other humans. There are four questions, weighted equally.
You have 24 hours to complete the exam from the time you rst
114.126 (Game Theory) Final Examination
Instructions: This is an open-book exam you may consult written material
but you may not consult other humans. There are ve questions, weighted equally.
You have 24 hours to complete the exam from the time you rst o
114.126 (Game Theory) Final Examination
Instructions: This is an open-book exam you may consult written material
but you may not consult other humans. There are ve questions, weighted equally.
You have 48 hours to complete the exam from the time you rst o