Photosynthesis Notes
Living things need energy to survive.
This energy comes from food. The energy in most food comes from the sun.
Autotrophs and Heterotrophs
Plants and some other types of organisms are able to use light energy from the sun to produc
The HersheyChase Experiment
Alfred Hershey and Martha Chase studied viruses nonliving particles smaller than a cell that can
infect living organisms.

Bacteriophages
A virus that infects bacteria
Bacteriophages are composed of a DNA or RNA core and a pr
Amsela Hodzic
25 Note Taking Review
1. A photographs exposure determines how light or dark and image will appear when its been
capture by your camera.
2. Camera exposure is determined by three camera settings: aperture, ISO and shutter speed (the
exposure
Patterns of Heritability
Trait specific characteristics that varies from individual to individual
Allele one of a number of different forms of a gene (Ex. black fur)
Genotype genetic make up of a trait
Usually expressed as a set of 2 alleles; homozygous (
Health MidTerm Exam Study Guide
SelfActualization to strive to be the best you can.
6 Components of Health environmental health, spiritual health, physical health, mental health,
social health, and emotional health
Integrity a firm observance of core et
10 Good Composition Photos
1. This photo shows very good, detailed
texture. This picture is so clear and detailed
and has a very nice shape for a circular motion.
2. This photo has very nice warm colors. It kind
of has a contrast between the dark road and
Cellular Respiration
1.
2.
3.
4.
Chemical Pathways
Cellular Respiration Steps & Where It Happens
Energy Tallys
Cell Respiration vs. Photosynthesis
Food serves as a source of raw materials for the cells in the body and as a source of energy.
Both plant a
Amsela Hodzic
Population Rat Paper
Do humans behave like rats? Some laboratory tests have shown that rats display evidence
of increased aggressiveness, competition, and violence when a large amount of rats are placed in
a box or are in close proximity. Wo
458
A. Lewko and B. Waters
that when a nominally semifunctional key is used to decrypt a semifunctional
ciphertext, the interaction of the two semifunctional components results in cancelation and decryption is successful. If the simulator attempts to a
484
M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, and G. Neven
Transform
WROBATK SROBATK
Encryption with unkeyed redundancy (EuR) No
No
Encryption with keyed redundancy (EkR)
Yes
No
Scheme setting
CS
PKE
CS
PKE
DHIES PKE
DHIES PKE
BF
IBE
BW
IBE
AICCA
Yes [15,4]
Yes
Yes [3]
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
477
works. When a semifunctional key is paired with a semifunctional ciphertext,
the blinding factor is obscured by an additional term: e(f1 , f2 )tw(zk zc ) . (When
zk = zc , decryption will still work.)
We wil
Robust Encryption
483
In this form, the method can easily provide weak robustness, and that too with
a very simple redundancy function, namely the one that simply returns K.
But we show that even encryption with keyed redundancy fails to provide
strong ro
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
459
short ciphertexts were particularly useful for applications, including forward secure encryption [12] and converting the NNL broadcast encryption system [16]
into a publickey system [17]. Gentry and Halevi [3
Robust Encryption
481
C under the decryption keys dk 0 , dk 1 corresponding to ek 0 , ek 1 are both non.
Both weak and strong robustness can be considered under chosen plaintext or
chosen ciphertext attacks, resulting in four notions (for each of PKE and
476
A. Lewko and B. Waters
e(C2,1 , K2,1 )e(C2,2 , K2,2 )e(C2,3 , K2,3 )
.
e(C1,1 , K1,1 )e(C1,2 , K1,2 )e(C1,3 K1,3 )
C.2
Complexity Assumptions
We state the assumptions we will rely on in our security proof. These are nonstandard assumptions, but we emp
500
1
B. Libert and M. Yung
Introduction
Introduced by Micali, Rabin and Kilian [21], zeroknowledge sets (ZKS) are fundamental secure data structures which allow a prover P to commit to a finite set
S in such a way that, later on, he will be able to ecie
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A. Lewko and B. Waters
Semifunctional Key. A semifunctional key is created as follows: first, a normal
key K1 , K2 is generated by the key generation algorithm. Random exponents
, zk ZN are chosen. K1 is set to be K1 g2 and K2 is set to be K2 g2zk .
466
A. Lewko and B. Waters
At some point, A sends B two messages, M0 and M1 , and a challenge identity,
ID. B sets cfw_0, 1 randomly. The challenge ciphertext is formed as:
C0 = M e(X1 X2 , g) , C1 = (X1 X2 )aID+b , C2 = X1 X2 .
We note that this sets g s
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
479
Lemma 12. Suppose there exists an algorithm A such that Gameq AdvA
GameF inal AdvA = . Then we can build an algorithm B with advantage in
breaking Assumption 3.
Proof. B is given
2
cfw_f1 , f1d , f1d , f1bx ,
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
461
We further require that the group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear
map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to . Also, we assume
the group descriptions of G and GT include generators
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
463
We note that the subgroup Gp2 is not used in our actual scheme, instead it
serves as our semifunctional space. Keys and ciphertexts will be semifunctional
when they include terms in Gp2 and decryption will p
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
A
471
Generic Security of Our Complexity Assumptions
We now prove our three complexity assumptions hold in the generic group model,
as long as it is hard to find a nontrivial factor of the group order, N . We adop
474
A. Lewko and B. Waters
If T Gp1 p3 , this is a normal key with g r equal to the Gp1 part of T . If T G,
this is a semifunctional key.
At some point, A sends B two messages, M0 and M1 , and a challenge identity,
(ID1 , . . . , IDj ). B sets cfw_0, 1 r
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
457
for dual systems is proved using a sequence of games which are shown to be
indistinguishable. The first game is the real security game (with normal ciphertext and keys). In the next game, the ciphertext is sem
470
A. Lewko and B. Waters
3. Gentry, C., Halevi, S.: Hierarchical identity based encryption with polynomially
many levels. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 437456.
Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
4. Gentry, C.: Practical identitybased e
Concise Mercurial Vector Commitments
503
qHCompk (m1 , . . . , mq ): takes as input an ordered tuple of messages. It outputs
a hard commitment C to (m1 , . . . , mq ) under the public key pk and some
auxiliary state information aux.
qHOpenpk (m, i, aux):
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
473
Lemma 6. Suppose there exists an algorithm A such that GameReal AdvA
GameRestricted AdvA = . Then we can build an algorithm B with advantage 2
in breaking either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2.
Proof. This proo
Robust Encryption
487
We will assume an aiadversary makes only one LR query, since a hybrid argument shows that making q of them can increase its aiadvantage by a factor of
at most q.
Oracle GetDK represents the IBE keyextraction oracle [11]. In the PK
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
467
Proof. If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then we have shown by the previous
lemmas that the real security game is indistinguishable from GameF inal , in which
the value of is informationtheoretically hidden fr
New Techniques for Dual System Encryption
475
Theorem 4. If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then our HIBE system is secure.
Proof. If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then we have shown by the previous
lemmas that the real security game is indistinguishable fr