University of Minnesota
8107 Macroeconomic Theory, Spring 2011, Mini 3
Fabrizio Perri
Lecture 2. Asset pricing with the representative agent
In this class well analyze a commonly used application of application of model economies in
which the RA holds, th
University of Minnesota
8107 Macroeconomic Theory, Spring 2011, Mini 3
Fabrizio Perri
Lecture 4. Aggregation with non homothetic preferences and skill heterogeneity
In this class we will consider a simplied version of the model described by Maliar and Mal
1
1.1
Problem 4
Part a
Dene the random variable X as number of successive recessions starting from today given that
today is already a recession. Then for any i N, we have:
P r(X = i) = (1 p)i1 p
Therefore, we have
i(1 p)i1 p = p
E [X ] =
i=1
We have,
ix
Econ 392M: Computational Economics I
Fall 2010, University of Texas
Instructor: Dean Corbae
Problem Set #4- Due 9/22/10
I. Consider the same environment as Huggett (1993, JEDC) except assume that there are
enforceable insurance markets regarding the idios
Matlab Introductory Course
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Tatjana Dahlhaus
tatjana.dahlhaus@uab.cat
BGSE
Matlab Introductory Course
Course Outline
The course is designed assuming no knowledge of the
program. The main reference is Winistrfer, P. an
University of Minnesota
8107 Macroeconomic Theory, Spring 2008, Mini 2
Fabrizio Perri
Transitions and aggregate uncertainty in economies with idiosyncratic Risk and
Incomplete Markets
So far, we have focused on stationary equilibria. However, most policy
University of Minnesota
8107 Macroeconomic Theory, Spring 2009, Mini 1
Fabrizio Perri
Lecture 2. Aggregation with non homothetic preferences and skill heterogeneity
In this class we will consider a simplied version of the model described by Maliar and Mal
University of Minnesota
8107 Macroeconomic Theory, Spring 2008, Mini 1
Fabrizio Perri
Lecture 1. Aggregation
1
Introduction
Probably so far in the macro sequence you have dealt directly with representative consumers and
representative rms, meaning that yo
Lecture Notes in Game Theory
Paulo Barelli
Overview
A game is a description of a strategic situation. Firms competing in a market
and consumers buying goods on eBay are examples of strategic situations, where
the actions of others inuence the result of on
Solving real business cycle models by solving
systems of rst order conditions
John H. Cochrane1
April 8, 2001
1 Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago. john.cochrane@gsb.uchicago.edu.
c
These notes are exactly the same as the 1993 draft. Copyr
Econ 392M: Computational Economics I
Fall 2010, University of Texas
Instructor: Dean Corbae
Problem Set #3- Due 9/15/10
1. Exercise 12.8 in S-L. Let S = [0, 1] and consider the difference equation
st+1 = 1 st .
a. What is the transition function P corresp