1
The King of Jeopardy!: Looking at the Concept of Risk-Taking in Ken Jennings Remarkable
Winning Streak
Adam Renfro
Professor Mueser
Economics 4970
Word Count: 4790
2
In 2004, on the 2nd of July, grandmothers around the nation got their first glimpse of
Economics 4340/7340 Game Theory
Homework 5, due Tuesday, May 5/2015
Problem 1 (25 points): Suppose a class of 1,000 students is comparing two careers doctor
or lawyer. Let n represent the number who choose to become doctors, so 1, 000 n is the
number who
Intermediate Macroeconomics
Economics 4353/7353
Spring 2015
Handout 11: Addendum
Use the charts below for Step 3 (which curves shift and why, upon initial
impact of the shock) in The Framework for qualitative analysis with the
IS-LM-FE model. You will sti
Intermediate Macroeconomics
Economics 4353/7353
Spring 2015
Handout 11
General Equilibrium in the Complete IS-LM-FE Model.
I. When all markets (labor market, goods market, asset market) are simultaneously in
equilibrium there is a general equilibrium. Thi
intermediate Macroeconomics
Economics 4353/7353
Spring 2015
Answers to Homework #3
Ql. (a) With the information given, the most straightforward way to answer this part of
the question is to make use of the equation: Y = C d + 15 + G . Substituting the
Intermediate Macroeconomics
Economics 4353/7353
Spring 2015
Practice Problem Set 3
1. Numerical Problem 1, p.354
2. Numerical Problem 2, p.354
3. Numerical Problem 2, p.401 (equilibrium values in this problem refers to general
equilibrium values only)
4.
Intermediate Macroeconomics
Economics 4353/7353
Spring 2015
Homework #3
Total Points: 56
Due date: May 7
Show your work. Make your explanations, (i.e. including your reasoning), explicit.
(20) Q1. An economy has full-employment output of Y = 1850. Desired
Intermediate Macroeconomics
Economics 4353/7353, Lecture 1
Spring 2015
Third Examination
Total points: 150
Show your work. Make your explanations, (i.e. including your reasoning), explicit.
(45) 1. An economy has full-employment output of Y = 1950. Desire
Economics 4340/7340: Solutions to Midterm Exam 2
Spring 2013
Question 1 The simultaneous-move game between Player 2 and Player 3 has the unique
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which Player 2 chooses between T and B with equal
probabilities, and Player