Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 1 due Monday February 15 You are encouraged to work in groups on these problems; however, you must turn in your own work, not a copy of what the group h
Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 1 Answers 1. [6 points] Consider the following three lotteries: 1 = [480, 0.5; 480, 0.5], 2 = [850, 0.5; 200, 0.5], and 3 = [1000, 0.5; 0, 0.5]. Each lo
Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 2 due Wednesday February 24 You are encouraged to work in groups on these problems; however, you must turn in your own work, not a copy of what the grou
Econ 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 6
Answers
Remark. PBE (as dened in Gibbons) and WPBE coincide in these particular
games. So I will simply refer to WPBE.
1. Gibbons 4.1.
(a)
R
L
M
ECON 467: Game Theory
Assignment 2
Due Wednesday February 10th in class
Problem 1
The bi-matrices below represent normal form games with two players. Player one
has two strategies (Top and Bottom) and
ECON 212 Game Theory
Fall 2010
Prof. Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set 4
1.
a. There are essentially two states: G in which (B, B) is expected to be play
ECON 467: Game Theory
Assignment 1
Due on Monday February 1st in class
(you may also drop it off before class in the 467 folder in Seigle 307)
Recommended reading: Osborne section 4.12
Optional additi
1
Homework #5 solutions / IEOR4407
1. (Gibbons 3.6) Following the arguments developed in class. Let bidder i bid bi = Si (vi ), where vi
are drawn from a Uniform(0, 1) distribution, and bidder i sees
1
Homework #1 solutions / IEOR4407
1.1. (Gibbons 1.2) Elimination of dominated strategies gives us the above table below:
T
M
B
L
(2,0)
(3,4)
(1,3)
C
(1,1)
(1,2)
(0,2)
R
(4,2)
) T
(2,3)
M
(3,0)
L
(2,0
ECON-459: Applied Game Theory
Problem Set 1 - Solutions
1. Problems 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8 from Gibbons.
Gibbons #1.5
The question asks you to express the Cournot duopoly game as a Prisoners Dilemma where
t
Game Theory - ECON 467
Homework 5: Solutions
Problem 1.
(1) See the paper.
(2) Lets first consider The game of 6 with Player A starts as well. Player
Bs strategy is a protocol how to act at each of si
ECON 467: Game Theory
Paulo Natenzon
Washington University in Saint Louis
Spring Term 2016
What is Game Theory?
I
It is the study of multiperson decision problems;
GT can be defined as the study of ma
Recall the Cournot Duopoly Model
Players N = cfw_1, 2 two firms
Actions S1 = S2 = [0, 1) quantity produced
Preferences Each firm only cares about its own profit
For each (q1 , q2 ) 2 S1 S2 ,
U1 (q1 ,
Economics 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 4
Answers
1. Gibbons 1.8. There is an asymmetric equilibrium in which two candidates are
at 2/3 and one is at 1/3, and the latter wins. There
Economics 504
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 3
Answers
1. (a) Each shareholder can be in one of two possible circumstances, given the
actions of the other shareholders. First, suppose 49
Economics 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 2
Answers
1. The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is in mixed strategies. In this Nash
equilibrium, your friend (row) randomizes ( 5 , 3
Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 3 Answers 1. Consider a market with an incumbent monopoly and one potential entrant. Suppose that the market demand curve is given by = 100 - and the ma
Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 3 due Wednesday March 31 You are encouraged to work in groups on these problems; however, you must turn in your own work, not a copy of what the group h
Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 4 Answers 1. (a) A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game consists of giving values for the following: The probability a low cost monopoly chooses h
Economics 467 Spring 2010 Karl Dunz Problem Set 4 due Monday April 12 You are encouraged to work in groups on these problems; however, you must turn in your own work, not a copy of what the group has
Econ 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 1
Answers
1. There are innitely many equilibria. For any d [0, 1], (d, 1 d) is an equilibrium. In addition, (1, 1) is an equilibrium.
It should be
Econ 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 8
Answers
1. (a) qH = 3. To see this, note rst that in any separating NE, the entrant
enters if it sees qH . This is a consequence of the fact tha
Econ 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 10
Answers
1. (a) If the seller reports c then his expected payo (net of c), assuming v = v ,
is
11
1
111
+ Ev [v 2 ] c2 = c Probv [v c] + + c2
42
Econ 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 7
Answers
1. The unique equilibrium in the proper subgame is for both players to randomize 50:50, with expected payos (1.5,0.5). Therefore, the un
Economics 467
Professor: John Nachbar
Spring 2011
Homework 5
Answers
1. Suppose only pirates 1 and 2 are left. Then 2 will propose 100 coins for himself,
and he will win. Write this assignment of coin
ECON 212 Game Theory (Honors)
Fall 2010
University of Pennsylvania
Suggested Solution for Problem Set #1
1. Gibbons 1.3
Description of the game: I = cfw_1, 2, S1 = S2 = [0, 1], and
si if si + sj 1
ui